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Question: 128 [<< | >>]
We must now consider the parts of fortitude; first we shall consider
what are the parts of fortitude; and secondly we shall treat of each part.
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Question: 128 [<< | >>]
Article: 1 [<< | >>]
Objection 1: It seems that the parts of fortitude are unsuitably assigned.
For Tully (De Invent. Rhet. ii) assigns four parts to fortitude, namely
"magnificence," "confidence," "patience," and "perseverance." Now
magnificence seems to pertain to liberality; since both are concerned
about money, and "a magnificent man must needs be liberal," as the
Philosopher observes (Ethic. iv, 2). But liberality is a part of justice,
as stated above (Question [117], Article [5]). Therefore magnificence should not be
reckoned a part of fortitude.
Objection 2: Further, confidence is apparently the same as hope. But hope does
not seem to pertain to fortitude, but is rather a virtue by itself.
Therefore confidence should not be reckoned a part of fortitude.
Objection 3: Further, fortitude makes a man behave aright in face of danger.
But magnificence and confidence do not essentially imply any relation to
danger. Therefore they are not suitably reckoned as parts of fortitude.
Objection 4: Further, according to Tully (De Invent. Rhet. ii) patience
denotes endurance of hardships, and he ascribes the same to fortitude.
Therefore patience is the same as fortitude and not a part thereof.
Objection 5: Further, that which is a requisite to every virtue should not be
reckoned a part of a special virtue. But perseverance is required in
every virtue: for it is written (Mt. 24:13): "He that shall persevere to
the end he shall be saved." Therefore perseverance should not be
accounted a part of fortitude.
Objection 6: Further, Macrobius (De Somn. Scip. i) reckons seven parts of
fortitude, namely "magnanimity, confidence, security, magnificence,
constancy, forbearance, stability." Andronicus also reckons seven virtues
annexed to fortitude, and these are, "courage, strength of will,
magnanimity, manliness, perseverance, magnificence." Therefore it seems
that Tully's reckoning of the parts of fortitude is incomplete.
Objection 7: Further, Aristotle (Ethic. iii) reckons five parts of fortitude.
The first is "civic" fortitude, which produces brave deeds through fear
of dishonor or punishment; the second is "military" fortitude, which
produces brave deeds as a result of warlike art or experience; the third
is the fortitude which produces brave deeds resulting from passion,
especially anger; the fourth is the fortitude which makes a man act
bravely through being accustomed to overcome; the fifth is the fortitude
which makes a man act bravely through being unaccustomed to danger. Now
these kinds of fortitude are not comprised under any of the above
enumerations. Therefore these enumerations of the parts of fortitude are
unfitting.
I answer that, As stated above (Question [48]), a virtue can have three kinds of
parts, subjective, integral, and potential. But fortitude, taken as a
special virtue, cannot have subjective parts, since it is not divided
into several specifically distinct virtues, for it is about a very
special matter.
However, there are quasi-integral and potential parts assigned to it:
integral parts, with regard to those things the concurrence of which is
requisite for an act of fortitude; and potential parts, because what
fortitude practices in face of the greatest hardships, namely dangers of
death, certain other virtues practice in the matter of certain minor
hardships and these virtues are annexed to fortitude as secondary virtues
to the principal virtue. As stated above (Question [123], Articles [3],6), the act of
fortitude is twofold, aggression and endurance. Now two things are
required for the act of aggression. The first regards preparation of the
mind, and consists in one's having a mind ready for aggression. In this
respect Tully mentions "confidence," of which he says (De Invent. Rhet.
ii) that "with this the mind is much assured and firmly hopeful in great
and honorable undertakings." The second regards the accomplishment of the
deed, and consists in not failing to accomplish what one has confidently
begun. In this respect Tully mentions "magnificence," which he describes
as being "the discussion and administration," i.e. accomplishment "of
great and lofty undertakings, with a certain broad and noble purpose of
mind," so as to combine execution with greatness of purpose. Accordingly
if these two be confined to the proper matter of fortitude, namely to
dangers of death, they will be quasi-integral parts thereof, because
without them there can be no fortitude; whereas if they be referred to
other matters involving less hardship, they will be virtues specifically
distinct from fortitude, but annexed thereto as secondary virtues to
principal: thus "magnificence" is referred by the Philosopher (Ethic. iv)
to great expenses, and "magnanimity," which seems to be the same as
confidence, to great honors. Again, two things are requisite for the
other act of fortitude, viz. endurance. The first is that the mind be not
broken by sorrow, and fall away from its greatness, by reason of the
stress of threatening evil. In this respect he mentions "patience," which
he describes as "the voluntary and prolonged endurance of arduous and
difficult things for the sake of virtue or profit." The other is that by
the prolonged suffering of hardships man be not wearied so as to lose
courage, according to Heb. 12:3, "That you be not wearied, fainting in
your minds." In this respect he mentions "perseverance," which
accordingly he describes as "the fixed and continued persistence in a
well considered purpose." If these two be confined to the proper matter
of fortitude, they will be quasi-integral parts thereof; but if they be
referred to any kind of hardship they will be virtues distinct from
fortitude, yet annexed thereto as secondary to principal.
Reply to Objection 1: Magnificence in the matter of liberality adds a certain
greatness: this is connected with the notion of difficulty which is the
object of the irascible faculty, that is perfected chiefly by fortitude:
and to this virtue, in this respect, it belongs.
Reply to Objection 2: Hope whereby one confides in God is accounted a theological
virtue, as stated above (Question [17], Article [5]; FS, Question [62], Article [3]). But by
confidence which here is accounted a part of fortitude, man hopes in
himself, yet under God withal.
Reply to Objection 3: To venture on anything great seems to involve danger, since
to fail in such things is very disastrous. Wherefore although
magnificence and confidence are referred to the accomplishment of or
venturing on any other great things, they have a certain connection with
fortitude by reason of the imminent danger.
Reply to Objection 4: Patience endures not only dangers of death, with which
fortitude is concerned, without excessive sorrow, but also any other
hardships or dangers. In this respect it is accounted a virtue annexed to
fortitude: but as referred to dangers of death, it is an integral part
thereof.
Reply to Objection 5: Perseverance as denoting persistence in a good deed unto
the end, may be a circumstance of every virtue, but it is reckoned a part
of fortitude in the sense stated in the body of the Article.
Reply to Objection 6: Macrobius reckons the four aforesaid mentioned by Tully,
namely "confidence, magnificence, forbearance," which he puts in the
place of patience, and "firmness," which he substitutes for perseverance.
And he adds three, two of which, namely "magnanimity" and "security," are
comprised by Tully under the head of confidence. But Macrobius is more
specific in his enumeration. Because confidence denotes a man's hope for
great things: and hope for anything presupposes an appetite stretching
forth to great things by desire, and this belongs to magnanimity. For it
has been stated above (FS, Question [40], Article [2]) that hope presupposes love and
desire of the thing hoped for.
A still better reply is that confidence pertains to the certitude of
hope; while magnanimity refers to the magnitude of the thing hoped for.
Now hope has no firmness unless its contrary be removed, for sometimes
one, for one's own part, would hope for something, but hope is avoided on
account of the obstacle of fear, since fear is somewhat contrary to hope,
as stated above, (FS, Question [40], Article [4], ad 1). Hence Macrobius adds security,
which banishes fear. He adds a third, namely constancy, which may be
comprised under magnificence. For in performing deeds of magnificence one
needs to have a constant mind. For this reason Tully says that
magnificence consists not only in accomplishing great things, but also in
discussing them generously in the mind. Constancy may also pertain to
perseverance, so that one may be called persevering through not desisting
on account of delays, and constant through not desisting on account of
any other obstacles.
Those that are mentioned by Andronicus seem to amount to the same as the
above. For with Tully and Macrobius he mentions "perseverance" and
"magnificence," and with Macrobius, "magnanimity." "Strength of will" is
the same as patience or forbearance, for he says that "strength of will
is a habit that makes one ready to attempt what ought to be attempted,
and to endure what reason says should be endured"---i.e. good courage
seems to be the same as assurance, for he defines it as "strength of soul
in the accomplishment of its purpose." Manliness is apparently the same
as confidence, for he says that "manliness is a habit of self-sufficiency
in matters of virtue." Besides magnificence he mentions {andragathia},
i.e. manly goodness which we may render "strenuousness." For magnificence
consists not only in being constant in the accomplishment of great deeds,
which belongs to constancy, but also in bringing a certain manly prudence
and solicitude to that accomplishment, and this belongs to {andragathia},
strenuousness: wherefore he says that {andragathia} is the virtue of a
man, whereby he thinks out profitable works.
Accordingly it is evident that all these parts may be reduced to the
four principal parts mentioned by Tully.
Reply to Objection 7: The five mentioned by Aristotle fall short of the true
notion of virtue, for though they concur in the act of fortitude, they
differ as to motive, as stated above (Question [123], Article [1], ad 2); wherefore they
are not reckoned parts but modes of fortitude.