

CIVIL AUTHORITY AND OBEDIENCE

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(social chain of love)

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## I N T R O D U C T I O N

"We hold these truths to be self-evident, that all men are created equal; that they are endowed by their Creator with certain unalienable rights that among these are life, liberty and the pursuit of happiness. That to secure these rights, governments are instituted among men, deriving their just powers from the consent of the governed." (1) In this famous declaration of Independence, Jefferson clearly affirms that government is a means to secure the human rights.

Not all supposes government to be a useful means, for at least Marx and Engels think that with the advent of a classless society after the communist revolution, the class war will come to an end and there will no longer be any need for government.

Let us neglect the ideology of Marx and be realistic. Clearly, the notation of Government involves the fundamental relations of ruling and being ruled, because government cannot consist of governors alone, any more than education can consist of teachers alone. It rises, therefore, the question of authority and obedience.

One man may obey another either voluntarily or involuntarily. Either because he recognizes the right vested in that other to give him commands or because he fears the consequences which he may suffer if he disobeys. In governments, authority elicits voluntary compliance, while power either actually coerces, or by threatening coercion, compels involuntary obedience.

So, these two kinds of obedience in some way correspond to the right and might in a government, but why should there be right and might? The federalists simply answer that in any society in which some men are good some bad, and all may be either at one time or another, force (might) is the only expedient to get the unwilling to do what they should do for the common good. While a government without right cannot exist at all, because the very existence of the government connects intimately with

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(1) Thomas Jefferson - The declaration of Independence, Chicago, 1952.

the right over the governed.

Even for Plato there was a problem of might and right facing the question of justice. It is the conflict between the exponents of might and the exponents of right; because we can think that might makes right and that justice is expediency and that we can think that power can be wrongly as well as rightly exercised and that justice, the measure of men and states, cannot be measured by utility.

I am not going to discuss how the might, which takes its origin from the consent of the governed, should be used, or in what extent could be executed. I am simply going to search into the depth of the origin and nature of right, which in the case of government corresponds to the civil authority.



## Chapter One : AUTHORITY

### § Principle of unity.

Wherever there is multitude of persons or of beings, it needs a principle of unity in order to attain a unique end ; even if the single beings by their own intrinsical nature are directed to unite themselves to constitute an unique whole ; given a common finality, which however specifically diverse from the individual finality.(1)

Exactly, our society is a harmonic approach of many free intellegent beings towards a common end. How could these free intellegent beings acquire this harmonic approach ? How could the common end be reached in the most suitable way ?

It demands necessarily the coordinance of means, not only internal but also external. The internal coordinance of means is not sufficient, because when we reach the agreement of a certain means in general, we need still the external coordinance of means in order to agree in particular actions towards the common end. It is convenient, therefore, that certain principle of unity coordinates the external means with an internal principle (2)

What, than, is the principle of unity in our society ? It is clear that the union of time or space attains its principal signification only in History or Geography. In a living society, it is the known and willed end that unites. This known and willed end is what Jefferson says : Liberty, Life, and Happiness, or in other words, the perfection of oneself in knowing the order, removing the obstacles of passions , the perfection of the will upon the conscience, following the right, correcting the wrong; the conservation of life, instincts of nature, and metaphysical reason. (3) In short, the development of the personal value of man. (4)

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(1) Olgiati Fr. - Il concetto di guiridicità , p.140 ,Milano,1943.

(2) Taparelli L.- Saggio teoretico di Diritto Naturale, §424, Roma, 1928.

(3) Taparelli L.- op. cit. §299.

(4) Pio XII - Radiomessaggio natalizio del 24 dicembre 1942.

§ Juridical order

Certainly, the individual person is the final end of our society. Explicitly, it is the common good that guides the direction of the society. There is no contradiction by putting the individual person and the common good together as the principle of unity in the society, as far as the common good must follow the personal value.

The common good, in the order of its realization, calls for the guarantee which the social justice confers to every situation determined valuably on the basement of the recognition which conforms to the truth. The common good, therefore, requires a double guarantee. Firstly, it must assure the determination of the content of the social justice. Without this element, the society will be something unnatural, like a group of alpinists who set out without being properly equipped. Secondly, one must expect with a moral certainty, that the members of the society are accomplishing their social prestation. The common good cannot be realized by one person only, but it requires the participation of many.

For these guarantees, it demands a competence of commanding to impose upon the members of the society the social justice on the limits of the society. This competence cannot be conferred at the same time to all the members of the society. It must create a juridical competence, which permits to impose obligation of social justice to the members of the society within the direction of the common good. (1)

This juridical order helps in obtaining the scope of the social life. It serves as an external support, of defence and protection. Its function is not to dominate but to serve. It tends to develop and to increase the vitality of the society in the rich multiplicity of its scopes, guiding towards their perfection all the individual energy in the peaceful concourse, and using appropriate and honest means to defend against all that is unfavourable to their principal development. (2)

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(1) Utz A. - L'ethique sociale, p. 166, Friburg, 1943.

(2) Pio XII - Radiomessaggio natalizio del 24 dicembre 1942.



§ Definition, essence of authority

We can try to answer the question which the Athenian stranger asked Plato - "What are the principles on which men rule and obey in cities ? Is there not one claim of authority which is always just ? " (1)

The principles on which men rule and obey in cities are common good, social justice and, after all social love. By authority, it should be distinguished into the authority prior to the society and the authority inner to the society. The former is the cause of the society while the latter is the consequence of the society. The authority prior to the society constitutes the common good and whereon causes the society is always just. The authority inner to the society is also called the juridical authority. It is not always just, but should strive to be so.

The juridical authority is the power of effective commandment which imposes obligation to a society the common good or the social justice. It is a quality of a personal being. It is the effective force by which an intelligent being exercises upon another intelligent being a decisive influence. Authority as power is not the same thing as a physical or psichical force which simply compels. Those who possess this kind of power does not possess necessarily authority. The person commanded should have the liberty, the liberty to act just opposite to the command. That is why authority is said to be a moral power. This moral power however bases essentially on the coercive power. (2)

Authority can be seen as the gratuitousness of the individual towards the universal and as the gratuitousness itself descends from universal to individual. In this light, authority is a continuous growth of a principle towards its end, and is the movement between the pole of individual and universal. In still another way, authority can be seen horizontally as a bond between beings for the common good, and vertically as a bond between the beings and the source of the common good.

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(1) Plato - Laws III, §690, p.670 d. G.B. Chicago, 1952.  
(2) Uts - op. cit. p. 168.

This shows that the essence of authority is not solely the dead relation of a simple connection unifying a multitude of points or individuals but the living reciprocity of the spirit with the being, where it develops and represents itself its double inverse becoming. The mutual action of these two beings gives birth to the relation of truth and of good; which do not take away their liberty, but in its turn take the common good under their eyes as the one good that surpassed themselves. (1)

### § Source of authority

The apparently opposite opinions about the source of authority between those who say that authority comes from God, and those who say authority comes from people can be reconciled according to Taparelli. God is the principle of authority, the multitude is the object, to unite is the end. If multitude doesn't exist, or if the multitude shouldn't be united, there would not happen to be something like authority. The multitude is, therefore, the cause by which we need the authority. (2)

### § Right and authority

Right is nothing more than represents a connection of actions to the order which already exist at first. Authority produces it by connecting in fact with the order that which at first didn't exist. So a general who commands in a just war a demolition, an attack, has the right to command and produces in the soldiers the right to demolish, to attack, which the soldiers haven't the right to do at first. It concludes, that authority is a right, but not all right is authority, (3) for right is always proceeded from a law, and the law from an authority. (4)

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(1) Fessard, Gaston - Autorité et Bien Commun, p. 28 c. Paris, 1944.  
(2) Taparelli L; - op. cit. § 484.  
(3) Taparelli L; - op. cit. § 346  
(4) Utz. A. - op. cit. p. 159.



§ Liberty and authority

Liberty and authority are founded rationally on the being and the laws of being. There must not be any contrast between them. In fact, though authority as a moral power bases essentially on the coercive power, it is still more essential that the person commanded have the liberty to act just the opposite.

Liberty and authority are both in function of the law of being. On one hand, I am not free to think that two plus two makes five, I am not free to lead to bad, but I am free only to unfold my activities in theoretical or practical order, according to the law of being. On the other hand, the true authority cannot command what is opposite to the law of being.

Liberty wants authority to be its guard and condition of its activities, which become always more larger and more elevated, Authority on its part, fits with liberty. Instead of restraining free energy, it breaks the chain of unreasoning passions. (1)

§ Obligation and authority

Does authority produce obligation, or just the opposite? Let us consider the following points. Intelligent beings cannot be binded together in judgement, if not from the evident truth; cannot be binded to act, if not from infinite good. Therefore, there exists in the society, by the nature of the same society, an intelligent principle which respecting the associated intelligent beings, attributes reasonably to certain means a participation of the infinite good, connecting it necessarily with the attainment of the infinite good. This is called obligation. So, there exists first the obligation, and by consequence the authority, which is the power to obligate. (2)

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(1) Olgiati Fr. - op. cit. p. 144  
(2) Taparelli L;- op. cit. § 425



There are, however, natural obligations and positive obligations. All the positive obligations have not force if not from the natural obligation. The natural obligation is a consequence of the order by which God with His wisdom ordain certain consequence after certain cause, e.g; health with temperance, the happiness of children with the obedience, the social harmony with the dependency to the authority etc. God puts the duty with the act of his will and so from the divine intelligence and will derives also every positive obligation.

Now that authority is the right of obligating the will of others, therefore all the authority is subordinated to the divine will and to the sublime intelligence from which authority moves. (1)

#### § Abuses and limits of authority

Though authority helps the individual and society to perfection, yet there are abuses. In the fact that authority abhors the way of research by demanding confidence, and moral judgement depends in a good part on authority, it sometimes mislead people not to the truth or the rectitude, because of the human shortcomings.

Therefore, an intelligent subject is required to keep the post of authority in order to ordinate a society to a common good, and help others to do the same. So it is clear that absolute lack of intelligence produces absolute incapacity of authority, and the temporal suspension of the use of intelligence, delirium, madness etc, suspend also the use of authority. (2)

Authority is in some manner limited ontologically and morally. Authority limits itself ontologically to the effective power of the holder of authority. That is what we say before, those who are not capable do not hold authority. Authority limits itself morally, because

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(1) Taparelli L. - op. cit. § 688  
(2) Taparelli L.; - op. cit. § 660

authority is the actualization of a physical force by the intervention of an order, which should not compel physically or psychically. (1)

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(1) Utz. A. - op. cit. p.169.

## Chapter Two : O B E D I E N C E

Man is created free, but has within the depth of his soul a vocation, an unceasing appeal of his conscience to the voice of God, who guides him by attracting him to Himself, who, having given man a decisive beginning and the heavy weight of the irremediable finality, invites him for an eternal appointment, showing him the road and every step, leaves to him the regulars of his responsible actions.

This is the nature of man. He possesses his liberty, destined to a finality, with his responsibility, and in the social situation, requested to contribute his part in the actualization of authority and obedience.

### § Virtue

By obedience here, I don't mean the involuntary obedience, by which man obeys because he fears the consequences which he may suffer if he disobeys. I mean the voluntary obedience, which is a kind of virtue.

Kant simply defines virtue as the strength of the man's maxim in his obedience to duty. (1) I would like to follow the scholastic definition saying that virtue is a habit and as such comes under the species of quality. It is that habit by which a person promptly and easily performs a good act. It is a habit disposing a power to elicit a good act and as such it may be said to complete and perfect the power itself. (2)

Power can be distinguished in two kinds, namely power in reference to being, and power in reference to act. The perfection of each of these is called virtue. Human virtue does not imply reference to being, which does not come under the human possibility, but rather to act. Consequently it is essential to human virtue to be an operative habit. (3)

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(1) Kant - Metaphysical elements of ethics, IX. G.B. Chicago, 1952.

(2) St. Thomas - Summa Theologica, Vol. III, New York, 1962.

(3) St. Thomas - op. cit. I-II Q.55 c.



§ Habit  
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An operative habit is caused by act, but is it enough to be caused by one act or must be caused by many? It is clear that habit is caused by act, in so far as a passive power is moved by an active principle. Now, in man the active principle which is reason cannot entirely overcome the appetitive power in one act, because the appetitive power is inclined variously and to many things, while the reason judges in a single act that should be willed in regard to various aspects and circumstances. Therefore the appetitive power is not entirely overcome by it, so as to be inclined as though naturally to the same thing in the majority of cases; which inclination belongs to the habit of virtue. So, a habit of virtue must be caused by many acts. (1)

According to our definition, a virtue is a good habit. Now habits are specifically distinct not only in respect of their objects and active principles, but also in their relation to nature. First, by reason of their suitability or unsuitability to nature. In this way a good habit is specifically distinct from a bad habit, since a good habit is one which disposes to an act suitable to the agent's nature, while an evil habit is one which disposes to an act unsuitable to nature. Secondly, habits are distinguished in relation to nature, from the fact that one habit disposes to an act that is suitable to a lower nature, while another habit disposes to an act befitting a higher nature. (2)

§ Essence of virtue  
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Now that we have seen virtue as a good habit, we can find out what is the essence of virtue, and to what virtue is ordered. In the essence of virtue, we may consider something directly, and we may consider something which is a consequence. Virtue implies directly a disposition by which the subject is well disposed, according to the mode of its nature hence Aristotle says that virtue is a disposition of a perfect thing to

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(1) St. Thomas - S.T. I-II Q. 52a 3

(2) St. Thomas - S.T. I-II Q. 54a 3

that which is best, and by perfect, it means that which is disposed according to its nature.

That which virtue implies as a consequence is that it is a kind of goodness, because the goodness of a thing consists in its being well disposed according to the mode of its nature. But that to which virtue is directed is a good act. Accordingly three things are found contrary to virtue; sin, malice, and vice. Sin, which is opposed to virtue in respect of that to which virtue is ordered, for properly speaking sin denotes a disordered act, just as an act of virtue is an ordered and due act. In respect of that which virtue implies as a consequence, namely that it is a kind of goodness, the contrary of virtue is malice; while in respect of that which belongs to the essence of virtue directly contrary is vice, for vice of a thing seems to consist in its not being disposed in a way befitting its nature. (1)

#### § Modes of virtue

The mode of virtue consists in three things. The first is that man should act knowingly, and this is subject to the judgement of both divine and human law, because what a man does in ignorance he does accidentally. Hence according to both human and divine law, certain things are judged in respect of ignorance to be punishable or pardonable. The second point is that a man should act deliberately, that is from choice, choosing that particular action for its own sake, where a twofold internal movement is implied of volition and of intention, and concerning these two, divine law alone and not human law is able to judge. The third point is that he should act from a firm and immovable principle which firmness belongs properly to a habit, and implies that the action proceeds from a rooted habit. (2)

#### § Numeration of virtue

Virtue according to Plato is the quality which makes a man good, whether in the sense of mind, character, desire or thinking, knowing etc.

(1) St. Thomas - S.T. I-II Q. 71 a1

(2) St. Thomas - S.T. I-II Q. 100 a.



According to Aristotle there are moral virtue, which includes justice, courage, temperance, intellectual virtue, which includes understanding, science, wisdom. But according to Aquinas, there are four cardinal virtues either in respect of their formal principles or according to their subjects.

For the formal principle of the virtue of which we speak now is the good of reason, which good can be considered in two ways. First as consisting in itself of reason, and thus we have one principle virtue, called prudence. Secondly, according as the reason puts its order into something else: either into operations and then we have justice, or into passions, and then there must be two virtues. For the need of putting the order of reason into the passion is due to their going against reason, and this occurs in two ways. First, by the passions inciting to something against reason, and then the passions need a curb, which we call temperance. Secondly, by the passions withdrawing us from following the dictate of reason, for instance, through fear of danger or toil, and then man needs to be strengthened, for that which reason dictates, lest he turn back; and to this end there is fortitude.

If we consider the subjects of the virtue, there are four: the power which is rational in its essence, and this is perfected by prudence: the power which is rational by participation, and is threefold, the will, subject of justice, the concupiscible part, subject of temperance, and the irascible part, subject of fortitude. (1)

#### § Justice

Among the four cardinal virtues, obedience belongs to the virtue of justice, because justice is a moral power constantly and perpetually inclining the will to give to others what belongs to them. It is a virtue that is necessary to preserve the proper balance and harmony of human

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(1) St. Thomas - S.T. I-II Q.61 c.



society into which man is constituted. There are three kinds of justice, Commutative justice, that is individuals as such respect the rights of every other individual. Legal justice, that is the individual cooperates for the good of the whole body of society as a whole (State). Distributive justice, that is the society as a whole secures to its individual members all that belongs to them by right.

Socrates says that justice is the only virtue which remain when the other virtues of temperance and courage and wisdom are abstracted. It is the ultimate cause and condition of the existence of all them and while remaining in them is also their preservative. It is the virtue which does not permit the several elements within a man to interfere with one another, or any of them to do the work of another.

#### § Obedience

Obedience frees oneself from particular interests and passions, guards oneself from falling into confusion of mind and action. Obedience makes a man's will prompt in fulfilling the will of a superior, the person that excels, that means giving to others what belongs to them.

But according to Hobbs, obedience is absolutely seen under a different way of thinking. He says, "To lay down a man's right to anything is to divest himself of the liberty of hindering another of the benefit of his own right to the same. For he that renounceth or passeth away his right giveth not to any other man a right which he had not before, because there is nothing to which every man had not right by nature, but only standeth out of his way that he may enjoy his own original right without hindrance from him; not without hindrance from another. So that the effect which redoundeth to one man by another man's defect of right is but a diminution of impediments to the use of his own right original. (1)

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(1) Hobbs.T. - Leviathan P;I C.XIV p.87 , G.B. Chicago, 1952.

§ Material and formal obedience

Obedience could be distinguished into two : general (material) obedience, when we obey after the consideration of the prudential contents of the command; special (formal) obedience, when we obey because we were commanded, after the consideration of the imperativity.

The material obedience is nothing more than the execution of a certain virtue that falls under the command, it is not an act of obedience in its proper sense; it follows that a child who takes the apple against the prohibition of his mother does'nt act disobediently, but greedy. The proper meaning of formal obedience is when the intention of the agent falls on the command not what is commanded but the fact that it is commanded.

§ Legal, cooperative, proper obedience

Other than the above distinction, obedience can be seen under another three aspects : legal obedience, cooperative obedience, and proper obedience.

Legal obedience demands us to obey all that the natural laws command, though not all the positive laws. Since the natural law is not written, and it takes tinctures and tests from the soils through which they run, we in obeying the natural laws help to develop to its perfection.

Cooperative obedience is based on the common good. It consists mainly on dialect and obligation. Through dialect it strives to be more perfect in commanding. Through obligation, it enforces others to follow the road leading to the common good. It is another side of the legal obedience.

Proper obedience is also called personal obedience, It is not for the sake of common good, but personal good. It is a kind of profession of faith, because one assents to a truth, not but of its extrinsic evidence, but out of authority. Through it man believes that God speaks . It is the triumph of objectivity and transcendental, because man see things in the light of providence.

#### § Limits of obedience

We see that he who obeys is moved at the bidding of the person who commands by a certain necessity of justice. Here we can see the limitation of obedience, because there is a necessity of justice. It follows that man is bound to obey his fellow-man in things that have to be done externally by means of the body ; and since by nature all man are equal, he is not bound to obey another man in matters touching the nature of the body, for instance in those relating to the support of his body or the vegetting of his children. Wherefore servants are not bound to obey their masters, nor children their parents, in the question of contracting marriage. But in matters concerning the disposal of actions and human affairs, a subject is bound to obey his superior within the sphere of his authority; for instance a soldier must obey his general in matters relating to war, a servant his master in matters relating the execution of the duties of his service, a son his father in matters relating to the conduct of his life and the care of the household. (1)

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(1) St. Thomas - S.T. II -II Q. 104,5c.



## Chapter Three : AUTHORITY and OBEEDIENCE

### § Two hostile powers

"There are two hostile powers in a nation, which under the appearance of peace, fight most furiously, they are those who govern and those who are governed. The social state is a work of necessity, is a state of restriction, of diminution, of dependence, in short, the state conforms nothing to the taste of the proper love of the governed. Therefore, all those who obey gravitate tactfully against those who command, and compel in all possible way to amplify the sphere of liberty and to restrict the sphere of authority."(1) These are the words of Spedalieri. I disagree absolutely with Spedalieri in this case to say that there is the furious fight between the governor and the governed, and I deny those two hostile powers in a nation.

### § Authority as fact and as value

Authority should not be regarded only as a fact, i.e. as sword, sceptre, law-court, prison, thread, but the same fact should be considered in its value. Children should be educated to see in the authority of their parents, not a father who shouts, loses temper, menaces, and beats, or a mother who in her character, draws them to think of a picture of the moon - though in the paternal or maternal command, in the correction and the punishment, to strike the dignity of man who represent to divine value, or the rational law and law of being to the children. Just like that should be the authority of the state. (2)

### § Authority as service

The exercise of authority is sacred, gratuitous and under the double visage of absolute love - authority as the communication of good from universal to individual, while obedience as the gratuitousness of the individual towards the universal. (3)

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(1) Spedalieri Nicola - Diritti dell'uomo, 1, l. c. 20 §16, Roma, 1643.  
(2) Olgiati Fr. - Il concetto di Giuricità, p. 141 Milano 1943.  
(3) Fessard G. - Autorité et Bien Commun, Paris, 1944

When the duke Ai asked "What should be done in order to secure the submission of the people?" Confucius replied, "Advance the upright and set aside the crooked, then the people will submit. Advance the crooked, and set aside the upright, then the people will not submit." (1) Authority is then a service to the people. The man in authority is not eating the bread of idleness. That is why Mencius says, "When a superior man resides in a country, if its sovereign employ his counsels, it comes to tranquility, wealth, honour, and glory. If the young in it follow his instructions, they become filial, obedient to their elders, true-hearted, and faithful. What greater example can there be than this of not eating the bread of idleness?" (2)

Rousseau says "The whole art of those great politicians lies in so mesmerising those they stand in need of that each may think he is labouring for his own interest in working for theirs. When the people is convinced that its rulers are labouring only for its happiness, its deference saves them the trouble of labouring to strengthen their power." (3) He is right when saying that the governors should work for the happiness of the governed, but wrong in saying that this is solely a means of the political art.

#### § Virtue as the guide of authority

Confucius aims to construct his ideal kingdom on the virtue of the governor, who leads his people to the peak of virtue. "If the people be led by laws, and uniformity sought to be given them by punishments, they will try to avoid the punishment, but have no sense of shame. If they be led by virtue, and uniformity sought to be given them by the rules of propriety, they will have the sense of shame, and moreover will become good." (4) In other place he says "He who exercises government

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- (1) Confucius - Confucian Analects, I, 29, HongKong, 1962
  - (2) Mencius - The works of Mencius, VII, I, 32, HongKong, 1962
  - (3) Rousseau - On political Economy, p.375 a-b, Chicago, 1952.
  - (4) Confucius - op. cit. II, V.

by means of his virtue may be compared to the north polar star, which keeps its place and all the stars turn towards it." (1)

#### § Obedience as love

From teh part of the people obedience should be practiced, not out of servile fear, but from a sense of charity, not through fear of punishment, but through love of justice. (2)

I take an example given by Hegel. In marriage, its objective source lies in the free consent of the persons to renounce their natural and individual personality to this unity of one with the other. From this point of view, their union is a self-restriction, but in fact it is their liberation, because in it they attain their substantive self-consciousness. (3)

It is the same in the case of obedience. When we obey, we follow the law of being, because the concept of authority identifies with the law of rationality and of being. It follows that nobody has the authority of commanding what is irrational or immoral. (4)

When the citizens loves their duty, and the guardians of the public authority sincerely apply themselves to the fostering of the love by their own example and assiduity, every difficulty vanishes. (5)

#### § Value and love

Let us consider the following points. Value demands the fact and right to follow the horizontal interaction between beings for the common good, and this same demand implies nothing more than the

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- (1) Confucius - op. cit. II, 1;
  - (2) St. Thomas- S.T. II-II, Q.104, 3c.
  - (3) Hegel - Philosophy of right, R. III, §162 p.58b, Chigago, 1952.
  - (4) Olgiati F.- op. cit. p.141
  - (5) Rousseau - On political Economy, p.373.



vertical interaction between the beings and the source of the common good to the value with the fact and the right.

Is not the common good always the true value that becomes the concret bond between the beings ? Is not the love any other thing than the value of the values ? Because the end of authority is love, it cannot increase, grow towards its end without bearing the same measure of the common good. (1)

When we draw a circle, we must try to make all the points of the curve line equal in distance to the centre - otherwise, we shall not have a circle, but more or less an artistic figure. The same to the authority, it is good and beautiful, if it corresponds to the law of being. (2)

If authority is the principle of the social existence, it is therefore in its very nature essentially beneficence. It is man who abuses it to do what is against its nature. If authority does good for the society, it naturally loves the society, and should be naturally beloved. The chain, therefore, which binds the subjects to the legitimate superiors is a chain of love, which breeds from the essence of their relation. (3)

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(1) Fessard G. - op; cit. p. 170  
(2) Gligiati F - op. cit. p. 143  
(3) Taparelli - op. cit. § 437

## C O N C L U S I O N

After this little ponderation over the meanings of authority and obedience, and opening the Encyclical of Pope John XXIII " Pacem in Terris ", I was deeply touched by the followingp concept.

" Authority is before all else a moral force. For this reason the appeal of rulers should be to the individual conscience to the duty which every man has of voluntarily contributing to the common good. " (§48)

" Authority is a necessary requirement of the moral order in human society. It ~~may~~ not therefore be used against that order." (§83)

" The whole 'raison d'etre' of public authority is to safeguard the interests of the community. Its sovereign duty is to recognize the noble realm of freedom and protect its rights. " (§104)

" It is necessary to have a relationships of society to an order that is genuinely human, that is to an order whose foundation is TRUTH, whose measure and objective is JUSTICE, whose driving force id LOVE and whose method of attainment id FREEDOM ." (§149)

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