TALK THREE - FAITH & REASON (180m)
---- Audio - Gregorian, Hildegard
---- City of God - Bk 8: Ch 3-11
---- Summa Contra Gentiles B1, A57
---- Catechism of the Catholic Church - 50, 1-159, 1706, 35-39
BOOK VIII CHAPTER 2
CONCERNING THE TWO SCHOOLS OF PHILOSOPHERS, THAT IS, THE ITALIC
AND IONIC
As far as concerns the literature of the Greeks, whose language
holds a more illustrious place than any of the languages of the other nations,
history mentions two schools of philosophers, the one called the Italic school,
originating in that part of Italy which was formerly called Magna Graecia; the
other called the Ionic school, having its origin in those regions which are
still called by the name of Greece. The Italic school had for its founder
Pythagoras of Samos, to whom also the term "philosophy" is said to
owe its origin. For whereas formerly those who seemed to excel others by the
laudable manner in which they regulated their lives were called sages,
Pythagoras, on being asked what he professed, replied that he was a
philosopher, that is, a student or lover of wisdom; for it seemed to him to be
the height of arrogance to profess oneself a sage. The founder of the Ionic
school, again, was Thales of Miletus, one of those seven who were styled the
"seven sages," of whom six were distinguished by the kind of life
they lived, and by certain maxims which they gave forth for the proper conduct
of life. Thales was distinguished as an investigator into the nature of things;
and, in order that he might have successors in his school, he committed his
dissertations to writing. That, however, which especially rendered him eminent
was his ability, by means of astronomical calculations, even to predict
eclipses of the sun and moon. He thought, however, that water was the first principle
of things, and that of it all the elements of the world, the world itself, and
all things which are generated in it, ultimately consist. Over all this work,
however, which, when we consider the world, appears so admirable, he set
nothing of the nature of divine mind. To him succeeded Anaximander, his pupil,
who held a different opinion concerning the nature of things; for he did not
hold that all things spring from one principle, as Thales did, who held that
principle to be water, but thought that each thing springs from its own proper
principle. These principles of things he believed to be infinite in number, and
thought that they generated innumerable worlds, and all the things which arise
in them. He thought, also, that these worlds are subject to a perpetual process
of alternate dissolution and regeneration, each one continuing for a longer or
shorter period of time, according to the nature of the case; nor did he, any
more than Thales, attribute anything to a divine mind in the production of all
this activity of things. Anaximander left as his successor his disciple
Anaximenes, who attributed all the causes of things to an infinite air. He
neither denied nor ignored the existence of gods, but, so far from believing
that the air was made by them, he held, on the contrary, that they sprang from
the air. Anaxagoras, however, who was his pupil, perceived that a divine mind
was the productive cause of all things which we see, and said that all the
various kinds of things, according to their several modes and species, were
produced out of an infinite matter consisting of homogeneous particles, but by
the efficiency of a divine mind. Diogenes, also, another pupil of Anaximenes,
said that a certain air was the original substance of things out of which all
things were produced, but that it was possessed of a divine reason, without
which nothing could be produced from it. Anaxagoras was succeeded by his
disciple Archelaus, who also thought that all things consisted of homogeneous
particles, of which each particular thing was made, but that those particles
were pervaded by a divine mind, which perpetually energized all the eternal
bodies, namely, those particles, so that they are alternately united and
separated. Socrates, the master of Plato, is said to have been the disciple of
Archelaus; and on Plato's account it is that I have given this brief historical
sketch of the whole history of these schools.
BOOK VIII CHAPTER 3
OF THE SOCRATIC PHILOSOPHY
Socrates is said to have been the first who directed the entire
effort of philosophy to the correction and regulation of manners, all who went
before him having expended their greatest efforts in the investigation of
physical, that is, natural phenomena. However, it seems to me that it cannot be
certainly discovered whether Socrates did this because he was wearied of
obscure and uncertain things, and so wished to direct his mind to the discovery
of something manifest and certain, which was necessary in order to the
obtaining of a blessed life, ‹ that one great object toward which the
labor, vigilance, and industry of all philosophers seem to have been directed, ‹ or whether (as some
yet more favorable to him suppose) he did it because he was unwilling that
minds defiled with earthly desires should essay to raise themselves upward to
divine things. For he saw that the causes of things were sought for by them, ‹ which causes he
believed to be ultimately reducible to nothing else than the will of the one
true and supreme God, ‹ and on this account he thought they could only be comprehended by
a purified mind; and therefore that all diligence ought to be given to the
purification of the life by good morals, in order that the mind, delivered from
the depressing weight of lusts, might raise itself upward by its native vigor
to eternal things, and might, with purified understanding, contemplate that
nature which is incorporeal and unchangeable light, where live the causes of
all created natures. It is evident, however, that he hunted out and pursued,
with a wonderful pleasantness of style and argument, and with a most pointed
and insinuating urbanity, the foolishness of ignorant men, who thought that
they knew this or that, ‹ sometimes confessing his own ignorance, and sometimes
dissimulating his knowledge, even in those very moral questions to which he
seems to have directed the whole force of his mind. And hence there arose
hostility against him, which ended in his being calumniously impeached, and
condemned to death. Afterwards, however, that very city of the Athenians, which
had publicly condemned him, did publicly bewail him, ‹ the popular
indignation having turned With such vehemence on his accusers, that one of them
perished by the violence of the multitude, whilst the other only escaped a like
punishment by voluntary and perpetual exile. Illustrious, therefore, both in
his life and in his death, Socrates left very many disciples of his philosophy,
who vied with one another in desire for proficiency in handling those moral
questions which concern the chief good (summum bonum), the possession of which
can make a man blessed; and because, in the disputations of Socrates, where he
raises all manner of questions, makes assertions, and then demolishes them, it
did not evidently appear what he held to be the chief good, every one took from
these disputations what pleased him best, and every one placed the final good
in whatever it appeared to himself to consist. Now, that which is called the
final good is that at which, when one has arrived, he is blessed. But so
diverse were the opinions held by those followers of Socrates concerning this
final good, that (a thing scarcely to be credited with respect to the followers
of one master) some placed the chief good in pleasure, as Aristippus, others in
virtue, as Antisthenes. Indeed, it were tedious to recount the various opinions
of various disciples.
BOOK VIII CHAPTER 4
CONCERNING PLATO But,
among the disciples of Socrates, Plato was the one who shone with a glory which
far excelled that of the others, and who not unjustly eclipsed them all. By
birth, an Athenian of honorable parentage, he far surpassed his
fellow-disciples in natural endowments, of which he was possessed in a
wonderful degree. Yet, deeming himself and the Socratic discipline far from
sufficient for bringing philosophy to perfection, he traveled as extensively as
he was able, going to every place famed for the cultivation of any science of
which he could make himself master. Thus he learned from the Egyptians whatever
they held and taught as important; and from Egypt, passing into those parts of
Italy which were filled with the fame of the Pythagoreans, he mastered, with
the greatest facility, and under the most eminent teachers, all the Italic
philosophy which was then in vogue. And, as he had a peculiar love for his master
Socrates, he made him the speaker in all his dialogues, putting into his mouth
whatever he had learned, either from others, or from the efforts of his own
powerful intellect, tempering even his moral disputations with the grace and
politeness of the Socratic style. And, as the study of wisdom consists in
action and contemplation, so that one part of it may be called active, and the
other contemplative, ‹ the active part having reference to the conduct of life, that is,
to the regulation of morals, and the contemplative part to the investigation
into the causes of nature and into pure truth, ‹ Socrates is said to
have excelled in the active part of that study, while Pythagoras gave more
attention to its contemplative part, on which he brought to bear all the force
of his great intellect. To Plato is given the praise of having perfected
philosophy by combining both parts into one. He then divides it into three
parts, ‹ the first moral, which is chiefly occupied with action; the
second natural, of which the object is contemplation; and the third rational,
which discriminates between the true and the false. And though this last is
necessary both to action and contemplation, it is contemplation, nevertheless,
which lays peculiar claim to the office of investigating the nature of truth.
Thus this tripartite division is not contrary to that which made the study of
wisdom to consist in action and contemplation. Now, as to what Plato thought
with respect to each of these parts, ‹ that is, what he
believed to be the end of all actions, the cause of all natures, and the light
of all intelligences, •X it would be a question too long to discuss, and about
which we ought not to make any rash affirmation. For, as Plato liked and
constantly affected the well-known method of his master Socrates, namely, that
of dissimulating his knowledge or his opinions, it is not easy to discover
dearly what he himself thought on various matters, any more than it is to
discover what were the real opinions of Socrates. We must, nevertheless, insert
into our work certain of those opinions which he expresses in his writings,
whether he himself uttered them, or narrates them as expressed by others, and
seems himself to approve of, ‹ opinions sometimes favorable to the true
religion, which our faith takes up and defends, and sometimes contrary to it,
as, for example, in the questions concerning the existence of one God or of
many, as it relates to the truly blessed life which is to be after death. For
those who are praised as having most closely followed Plato, who is justly
preferred to all the other philosophers of the Gentiles, and who are said to
have manifested the greatest acuteness in understanding him, do perhaps
entertain such an idea of God as to admit that in Him are to be found the cause
of existence, the ultimate reason for the understanding, and the end in
reference to which the whole life is to be regulated. Of which three things,
the first is understood to pertain to the natural, the second to the rational,
and the third to the moral part of philosophy. For if man has been so created
as to attain, through that which is most excellent in him, to that which excels
all things, ‹ that is, to the one true and absolutely good God, without whom no
nature exists, no doctrine instructs, no exercise profits, ‹ let Him be sought
in whom all things are secure to us, let Him be discovered in whom all truth
becomes certain to us, let Him be loved in whom all becomes right to us.
BOOK VIII CHAPTER 5
THAT IT IS ESPECIALLY WITH THE PLATONISTS, THEIR OPINIONS BEING
PREFERABLE TO THOSE OF ALL OTHER PHILOSOPHERS
If, then, Plato defined the wise man as one who imitates, knows,
loves this God, and who is rendered blessed through fellowship with Him in His
own blessedness, why discuss with the other philosophers? It is evident that
none come nearer to us than the Platonists. To them, therefore, let that
fabulous theology give place which delights the minds of men with the crimes of
the gods; and that civil theology also, in which impure demons, under the name
of gods, have seduced the peoples of the earth given up to earthly pleasures,
desiring to be honored by the errors of men, and by filling the minds of their
worshippers with impure desires, exciting them to make the representation of
their crimes one of the rites of their worship, whilst they themselves found in
the spectators of these exhibitions a most pleasing spectacle, ‹ a theology in
which, whatever was honorable in the temple, was defiled by its mixture with
the obscenity of the theater, and whatever was base in the theater was
vindicated by the abominations of the temples. To these philosophers also the
interpretations of Varro must give place, in which he explains the sacred rites
as having reference to heaven and earth, and to the seeds and operations of
perishable things; for, in the first place, those rites have not the
signification which he would have men believe is attached to them, and
therefore truth does not follow him in his attempt so to interpret them; and
even if they had this signification, still those things ought not to be
worshipped by the rational soul as its god which are placed below it in the
scale of nature, nor ought the soul to prefer to itself as gods things to which
the true God has given it the preference. The same must be said of those
writings pertaining to the sacred rites, which Numa Pompilius took care to
conceal by causing them to be buried along with himself, and which, when they
were afterwards turned up by the plough, were burned by order of the senate.
And, to treat Numa with all honor, let us mention as belonging to the same rank
as these writings that which Alexander of Macedon wrote to his mother as
communicated to him by Leo, an Egyptian high priest. In this letter not only
Picus and Faunus, and Aeneas and Romulus or even Hercules, and Aesculapius and
Liber, born of Semele, and the twin sons of Tyndareus, or any other mortals who
have been deified, but even the principal gods themselves, to whom Cicero, in
his Tusculan questions, alludes without mentioning their names, Jupiter, Juno,
Saturn, Vulcan, Vesta, and many others whom Varro attempts to identify with the
parts or the elements of the world, are shown to have been men. There is, as we
have said, a similarity between this case and that of Numa; for the priest
being afraid because he had revealed a mystery, earnestly begged of Alexander
to command his mother to burn the letter which conveyed these communications to
her. Let these two theologies, then, the fabulous and the civil, give place to
the Platonic philosophers, who have recognized the true God as the author of
all things, the source of the light of truth, and the bountiful bestower of all
blessedness. And not these only, but to these great acknowledgers of so great a
God, those philosophers must yield who, having their mind enslaved to their
body, supposed the principles of all things to be material; as Thales, who held
that the first principle of all things was water; Anaximenes, that it was air;
the Stoics, that it was fire; Epicurus, who affirmed that it consisted of
atoms, that is to say, of minute corpuscules; and many others whom it is
needless to enumerate, but who believed that bodies, simple or compound,
animate or inanimate, but nevertheless bodies, were the cause and principle of
all things. For some of them ‹ as, for instance, the Epicureans ‹ believed that
living things could originate from things without life; others held that all
things living or without life spring from a living principle, but that,
nevertheless, all things, being material, spring from a material principle. For
the Stoics thought that fire, that is, one of the four material elements of
which this visible world is composed, was both living and intelligent, the
maker of the world and of all things contained in it, ‹ that it was in fact
God. These and others like them have only been able to suppose that which their
hearts enslaved to sense have vainly suggested to them. And yet they have
within themselves Something which they could not see: they represented to
themselves inwardly things which they had seen without, even when they were not
seeing them, but only thinking of them. But this representation in thought is
no longer a body, but only the similitude of a body; and that faculty of the
mind by which this similitude of a body is seen is neither a body nor the
similitude of a body; and the faculty which judges whether the representation
is beautiful or ugly is without doubt superior to the object judged of. This
principle is the understanding of man, the rational soul; and it is certainly
not a body, since that similitude of a body which it beholds and judges of is
itself not a body. The soul is neither earth, nor water, nor air, nor fire, of
which four bodies, called the four elements, we see that this world is
composed. And if the soul is not a body, how should God, its Creator, be a
body? Let all those philosophers, then, give place, as we have said, to the
Platonists, and those also who have been ashamed to say that God is a body, but
yet have thought that our souls are of the same nature as God. They have not
been staggered by the great changeableness of the soul, ‹ an attribute which
it would be impious to ascribe to the divine nature, ‹ but they say it is
the body which changes the soul, for in itself it is unchangeable. As well
might they say, "Flesh is wounded by some body, for in itself it is
invulnerable." In a word, that which is unchangeable can be changed by
nothing, so that that which can be changed by the body cannot properly be said
to be immutable.
BOOK VIII CHAPTER 6
OF THE UNDERSTADING OF THE PLATONISTS IN PHYSICAL PHILOSOPHY
These philosophers, then, whom we see not undeservedly exalted
above the rest in fame and glory, have seen that no material body is God, and
therefore they have transcended all bodies in seeking for God. They have seen
that whatever is changeable is not the most high God, and therefore they have
transcended every soul and all changeable spirits in seeking the supreme. They
have seen also that, in every changeable thing, the form which makes it that
which it is, whatever be its mode or nature, can only be through Him who truly
is, because He is unchangeable. And therefore, whether we consider the whole
body of the world, its figure, qualities, and orderly movement, and also all
the bodies which are in it; or whether we consider all life, either that which
nourishes and maintains, as the life of trees, or that which, besides this, has
also sensation, as the life of beasts; or that which adds to all these
intelligence, as the life of man; or that which does not need the support of
nutriment, but only maintains, feels, understands, as the life of angels, ‹ all can only be
through Him who absolutely is. For to Him it is not one thing to be, and
another to live, as though He could be, not living; nor is it to Him one thing
to live, and another thing to understand, as though He could live, not
understanding; nor is it to Him one thing to understand, another thing to be
blessed, as though He could understand and not be blessed. But to Him to live,
to understand, to be blessed, are to be. They have understood, from this
unchangeableness and this simplicity, that all things must have been made by
Him, and that He could Himself have been made by none. For they have considered
that whatever is either body or life, and that life is something better than
body, and that the nature of body is sensible, and that of life intelligible.
Therefore they have preferred the intelligible nature to the sensible. We mean
by sensible things such things as can be perceived by the sight and touch of
the body; by intelligible things, such as can be understood by the sight of the
mind For there is no corporeal beauty, whether in the condition of a body, as
figure, or in its movement, as in music, of which it is not the mind that
judges. But this could never have been, had there not existed in the mind
itself a superior form of these things, without bulk, without noise of voice,
without space and time. But even in respect of these things, had the mind not
been mutable, it would not have been possible for one to judge better than
another with regard to sensible forms. He who is clever, judges better than he
who is slow, he who is skilled than he who is unskillful, he who is practiced
than he who is unpracticed; and the same person judges better after he has
gained experience than he did before. But that which is capable of more and
less is mutable; whence able men, who have thought deeply on these things, have
gathered that the first form is not to be found in those things whose form is
changeable. Since, therefore, they saw that body and mind might be more or less
beautiful in form, and that, if they wanted form, they could have no existence,
they saw that there is some existence in which is the first form, unchangeable,
and therefore not admitting of degrees of comparison, and in that they most
rightly believed was the first principle of things which was not made, and by
which all things were made. Therefore that which is known of God He manifested
to them when His invisible things were seen by them, being understood by those
things which have been made; also His eternal power and Godhead by whom all
visible and temporal things have been created. We have said enough upon that
part of theology which they call physical, that is, natural.
BOOK VIII CHAPTER 7
HOW MUCH THE PLATONISTS ARE TO BE HELD AS EXCELLING OTHER
PHILOSOPHERS
Then, again, as far as regards the doctrine which treats of that
which they call logic, that is, rational philosophy, far be it from us to
compare them with those who attributed to the bodily senses the faculty of
discriminating truth, and thought, that all we learn is to be measured by their
untrustworthy and fallacious rules. Such were the Epicureans, and all of the
same school. Such also were the Stoics, who ascribed to the bodily senses that
expertness in disputation which they so ardently love, called by them
dialectic, asserting that from the senses the mind conceives the notions
(e}nnoiai) of those things which they explicate by definition. And hence is developed
the whole plan and connection of their learning and teaching. I often wonder,
with respect to this, how they can say that none are beautiful but the wise;
for by what bodily sense have they perceived that beauty, by what eyes of the
flesh have they seen wisdom's comeliness of form? Those, however, whom we
justly rank before all others, have distinguished those things which are
conceived by the mind from those which are perceived by the senses, neither
taking away from the senses anything to which they are competent, nor
attributing to them anything beyond their competency. And the light of our
understandings, by which all things are learned by us, they have affirmed to be
that selfsame God by whom all things were made.
BOOK VIII CHAPTER 8
THAT THE PLATONISTS HOLD THE FIRST RANK IN MORAL PHILOSOPHY
The remaining part of philosophy is morals, or what is called by
the Greeks hjqikh>, in which is discussed the question concerning the chief
good, ‹ that which will leave us nothing further to seek in order to be
blessed, if only we make all our actions refer to it, and seek it not for the
sake of something else, but for its own sake. Therefore it is called the end,
because we wish other things on account of it, but itself only for its own
sake. This beatific good, therefore, according to some, comes to a man from the
body, according to others, from the mind, and, according to others, from both
together. For they saw that man himself consists of soul and body; and
therefore they believed that from either of these two, or from both together,
their well-being must proceed, consisting in a certain final good, which could
render them blessed, and to which they might refer all their actions, not
requiring anything ulterior to which to refer that good itself. This is why
those who have added a third kind of good things, which they call extrinsic, ‹ as honor, glory,
wealth, and the like, ‹ have not regarded them as part of the final good, that is, to be
sought after for their own sake, but as things which are to be sought for the
sake of something else, affirming that this kind of good is good to the good,
and evil to the evil. Wherefore, whether they have sought the good of man from
the mind or from the body, or from both together, it is still only from man
they have supposed that it must be sought. But they who have sought it from the
body have sought it from the inferior part of man; they who have sought it from
the mind, from the superior part; and they who have sought it from both, from
the whole man. Whether therefore, they have sought it from any part, or from
the whole man, still they have only sought it from man; nor have these
differences, being three, given rise only to three dissentient sects of
philosophers, but to many. For diverse philosophers have held diverse opinions,
both concerning the good of the body, and the good of the mind, and the good of
both together. Let, therefore, all these give place to those philosophers who
have not affirmed that a man is blessed by the enjoyment of the body, or by the
enjoyment of the mind, but by the enjoyment of God, ‹ enjoying Him,
however, not as the mind does the body or itself, or as one friend enjoys
another, but as the eye enjoys light, if, indeed, we may draw any comparison
between these things. But what the nature of this comparison is, will, if God
help me, be shown in another place, to the best of my ability. At present, it
is sufficient to mention that Plato determined the final good to be to live
according to virtue, and affirmed that he only can attain to virtue who knows
and imitates God, ‹ which knowledge and imitation are the only cause of blessedness.
Therefore he did not doubt that to philosophize is to love God, whose nature is
incorporeal. Whence it certainly follows that the student of wisdom, that is,
the philosopher, will then become blessed when he shall have begun to enjoy
God. For though he is not necessarily blessed who enjoys that which he loves
(for many are miserable by loving that which ought not to be loved, and still
more miserable when they enjoy it), nevertheless no one is blessed who does not
enjoy that which he loves. For even they who love things which ought not to be
loved do not count themselves blessed by loving merely, but by enjoying them.
Who, then, but the most miserable will deny that he is blessed, who enjoys that
which he loves, and loves the true and highest good? But the true and highest
good, according to Plato, is God, and therefore he would call him a philosopher
who loves God; for philosophy is directed to the obtaining of the blessed life,
and he who loves God is blessed in the enjoyment of God.
BOOK VIII CHAPTER 9
CONCERNING THAT PHILOSOPHY WHICH HAS COME NEAREST TO THE CHRISTIAN
FAITH
Whatever philosophers, therefore, thought concerning the supreme
God, that He is both the maker of all created things, the light by which things
are known, and the good in reference to which things are to be done; that we
have in Him the first principle of nature, the truth of doctrine, and the
happiness of life, ‹ whether these philosophers may be more suitably called
Platonists, or whether they may give some other name to their sect; whether, we
say, that only the chief men of the Ionic school, such as Plato himself, and
they who have well understood him, have thought thus; or whether we also
include the Italic school, on account of Pythagoras and the Pythagoreans, and
all who may have held like opinions; and, lastly, whether also we include all
who have been held wise men and philosophers among all nations who are
discovered to have seen and taught this, be they Atlantics, Libyans, Egyptians,
Indians, Persians, Chaldeans, Scythians, Gauls, Spaniards, or of other nations,
‹ we prefer these to all other philosophers, and confess that they
approach nearest to us.
BOOK VIII CHAPTER 10
THAT THE EXCELLENCY OF THE CHRISTIAN RELIGION IS ABOVE ALL THE
SCIENCE OF PHILOSOPHERS
For although a Christian man instructed only in ecclesiastical
literature may perhaps be ignorant of the very name of Platonists, and may not
even know that there have existed two schools of philosophers speaking the
Greek tongue, to wit, the Ionic and Italic, he is nevertheless not so deaf with
respect to human affairs, as not to know that philosophers profess the study,
and even the possession, of wisdom. He is on his guard, however, with respect
to those who philosophize according to the elements of this world, not
according to God, by whom the world itself was made; for he is warned by the
precept of the apostle, and faithfully hears what has been said, "Beware
that no one deceive you through philosophy and vain deceit, according to the
elements of the world." Then, that he may not suppose that all
philosophers are such as do this, he hears the same apostle say concerning
certain of them, "Because that which is known of God is manifest among
them, for God has manifested it to them. For His invisible things from the
creation of the world are clearly seen, being understood by the things which
are made, also His eternal power and Godhead." And, when speaking to the Athenians,
after having spoken a mighty thing concerning God, which few are able to
understand, "In Him we live, and move, and have our being," he goes
on to say, "As certain also of your own have said." He knows well,
too, to be on his guard against even these philosophers in their errors. For
where it has been said by him, "that God has manifested to them by those
things which are made His invisible things, that they might be seen by the
understanding," there it has also been said that they did not rightly
worship God Himself, because they paid divine honors, which are due to Him
alone, to other things also to which they ought not to have paid them, ‹ "because,
knowing God, they glorified Him not as God: neither were thankful, but became
vain in their imaginations, and their foolish heart was darkened. Professing
themselves to be wise, they became fools, and changed the glory of the
incorruptible God into the likeness of the image of corruptible man, and of
birds, and fourfooted beasts, and creeping things;" ‹ where the apostle
would have us understand him as meaning the Romans, and Greeks, and Egyptians,
who gloried in the name of wisdom; but concerning this we will dispute with
them afterwards. With respect, however, to that wherein they agree with us we
prefer them to all others namely, concerning the one God, the author of this
universe, who is not only above every body, being incorporeal, but also above
all souls, being incorruptible ‹ our principle, our light, our good. And
though the Christian man, being ignorant of their writings, does not use in
disputation words which he has not learned, •X not calling that part of
philosophy natural (which is the Latin term), or physical which is the Greek
one), which treats of the investigation of nature; or that part rational, or
logical, which deals with the question how truth may be discovered; or that
part moral, or ethical, which concerns morals, and shows how good is to be
sought, and evil to be shunned, ‹ he is not,
therefore, ignorant that it is from the one true and supremely good God that we
have that nature in which we are made in the image of God, and that doctrine by
which we know Him and ourselves, and that grace through which, by cleaving to
Him, we are blessed. This, therefore, is the cause why we prefer these to all
the others, because, whilst other philosophers have worn out their minds and
powers in seeking the causes of things, and endeavoring to discover the right
mode of learning and of living, these, by knowing God, have found where resides
the cause by which the universe has been constituted, and the light by which
truth is to be discovered, and the fountain at which felicity is to be drunk.
All philosophers, then, who have had these thoughts concerning God, whether
Platonists or others, agree with us. But we have thought it better to plead our
cause with the Platonists, because their writings are better known. For the
Greeks, whose tongue holds the highest place among the languages of the
Gentiles, are loud in their praises of these writings; and the Latins, taken
with their excellence, or their renown, have studied them more heartily than
other writings, and, by translating them into our tongue, have given them
greater celebrity and notoriety.
-------------------------------------------------
Summa Contra Gentiles
B1, A57: Plato's Theory of the Union of the Intellectual Soul with the
Body* MOVED by these and the
like objections, some have said that no subsistent intelligence can possibly be
the form of a body. But because the nature of man of itself seemed to give the
lie to this statement, inasmuch as man is seen to be composed of an
intellectual soul and a body, they have thought out various ways to save the
nature of man and adjust their theory to fact. Plato therefore and his
followers laid it down that the intellectual soul is not united with the body
as form with matter, but only as the mover is with the moved, saying that the
soul is in the body as a sailor in his boat:* thus the union of soul and body
would be virtual contact only, of which above (Chap. LVI). But as such contact
does not produce absolute oneness, this statement leads to the awkward
consequence that man is not absolutely one, nor absolutely a being at all, but
is a being only accidentally.* To escape this conclusion, Plato laid it down
that man is not a compound of soul and body, but that the soul using the body
is man.* This position is shown to be impossible: for things different in being
cannot have one and the same activity. I call an activity one and the same, not
in respect to the effect to which the activity is terminated, but as it comes
forth from the agent. It is true that many men towing a boat make one action in
respect of the thing done, which is one; but still on the part of the men
towing there are many actions, as there are many different strains and
exertions to haul the boat along: for as action is consequent upon form and
power, it follows that where there are different forms and powers there must
also be different actions. Now though the soul has a certain proper motion of
its own, which it performs independently of the body, namely, the act of
understanding, there are however other activities common to soul and body,
namely, those of fear, anger, sensation, and the like; for these only come
about by some change wrought in some definite part of the body; hence evidently
they are conjoint activities of soul and body. Therefore out of soul and body
there must result one being, and the two cannot be distinct in being. But this
reasoning may be met by the following reply on behalf of Plato's view. -- There
is no difficulty, it will be said, in mover and moved having the same act,
notwithstanding their difference in being: for motion is at once the act of the
moving force, from which it is, and the act of the thing moved, in which it is.
Thus then, on Plato's theory, the aforesaid activities may be common to soul
and body, belonging to the soul as the moving force, and to the body as the
thing moved. But this explanation cannot hold for the following reasons. 1. As
the Philosopher proves (De Anima, II), sensation results by the sentient
subject being moved or impressed by external sensible things: hence a man
cannot have a sensation without some external sensible thing,* as nothing can
be moved without a mover. The sensory organ therefore is moved and impressed in
sensation, but that is by the external sensible object. What receives the
impression is the sense, as is evident from this, that senseless things do not
receive any such manner of impression from sensible objects. The sense
therefore is the passive power of the sensory organ. The sentient soul
therefore in sensation does not play the part of mover and agent, but is that
principle in the subject impressed, in virtue of which the said subject lies
open to the impression. But such a principle cannot be different in being from
the subject impressed. Therefore the sentient soul is not different in being
from the animated body. 2. Though motion is the common act of moving force and
object moved, still it is one activity to impart motion and another to receive
motion: hence the two several categories of action and passion. If then in
sensation the sentient soul stands for the agent, and the body for the patient,
there will be one activity of the soul and another of the body. The sentient
soul therefore will have an activity and proper motion of its own: it will have
therefore its own subsistence: therefore, when the body perishes, it will not
cease to be.* Thus sentient souls, even of irrational animals, will be immortal;
which seems improbable, although it is not out of keeping with Plato's
opinion.* But this will be matter of enquiry further on (Chap. LXXXII). 3. A
body moved does not take its species according to the power that moves it. If
therefore the soul is only united to the body as mover to moved, the body and
its parts do not take their species from the soul: therefore, when the soul
departs, the body and the parts thereof will remain of the same species. But
this is manifestly false: for flesh and bone and hands and such parts, after
the departure of the soul, do not retain their own names except by a facon de
parler;* since none of these parts retains its proper activity, and activity
follows species. Therefore the union of soul and body is not that of mover with
moved, or of a man with his dress. 6. If the soul is united with the body only
as mover with moved, it will be in the power of the soul to go out of the body
when it wishes, and, when it wishes, to reunite itself with the body.* That the
soul is united with the body as the proper form of the same, is thus proved.
That whereby a thing emerges from potential to actual being, is its form and
actuality. But by the soul the body emerges from potentiality to actuality: for
the being of a living thing is its life: moreover the seed before animation is
only potentially alive, and by the soul it is made actually alive:* the soul
therefore is the form of the animated body. Again: as part is to part, so is
the whole sentient soul to the whole body. But sight is the form and actuality
of the eye:* therefore the soul is the form and actuality of the body.
------------------------
A WORD in conclusion
from the translator, or restorer.
I find myself
surrounded with debris which I have found it necessary to remove from the
structure of the Contra Gentiles: -- Ptolemaic astronomy pervading the work
even to the last chapter; a theory
of divine providence adapted to this obsolete astronomy (B. III, Chapp. XXII,
XXIII, LXXXII, XCI, XCII); an
incorrect view of motion (B. I, Chap. XIII); archaic embryology (B. II, Chapp.
LXXXVI, LXXXIX); total ignorance
of chemistry, and even of the existence of molecular physics: deficient
scholarship, leading at times to incorrect exegesis (B. IV, Chap. VII, #5:
Chap. XVII, #2: Chap. XXXIV in Heb. ii, 10): even a theology of grace and the Sacraments that might here
and there have expressed itself otherwise had the writer lived subsequently to
the Council of Trent and the Baian and Jansenist controversies (B. III, Chap.
L): finally, an over-cultivation
of genera and species, that is, of logical classification, issuing in a
tendency to deductive argument from essences downwards to effects, as though
whatever is most valuable in human knowledge could be had by the Aristotelian
method of 'demonstration,' with comparatively slight regard to observation and
experiment, to critical, historical, and a posteriori methods generally. It may
be asked: Seeing that St Thomas is so often at fault in matter where his
doctrines have come under the test of modern experimental science and
criticism, what confidence can be reposed in him on other points, where his
conclusions lie beyond the reach of experience? To a Catholic the answer is
simple enough; and it shall be given in St Thomas's own words: "Our faith
reposes on the revelation made to the Apostles and Prophets who have written
the Canonical Books, not on any revelation that may have been made to other
Doctors" (Sum. Theol. I, q. 8 ad 2, -- the context is worth reading). Our confidence is limited in
conclusions of mere reason, by whomsoever drawn: our confidence is unlimited in
matters of faith, as taught by the Church (B. I, Chapp. III-VI). The practical
value of the Summa contra Gentiles lies in its exposition of the origin,
nature, duty, and destiny of man, according to the scheme of Catholic
Christianity. That scheme stands whole and entire in the twentieth century as
it stood in the thirteenth: in that, there is nothing to alter in the Contra
Gentiles: it is as practical a book as ever it was. The debris are the debris
of now worn-out human learning, which St Thomas used as the best procurable in
his day, to encase and protect the structure of faith. Or, to express myself in
terms of the philosophy of our day, dogma has not changed, but our
'apperception' of it, or the 'mental system' into which we receive it. So the
Summa contra Gentiles stands, like the contemporary edifices of Ely and
Lincoln: it stands, and it will stand, because it was built by a Saint and a
man of genius on the rock of faith. The Summa contra Gentiles is an historical
monument of the first importance for the history of philosophy. In the variety
of its contents, it is a perfect encyclopaedia of the learning of the day. By
it we can fix the high water mark of thirteenth-century thought: -- for it
contains the lectures of a Doctor second to none in the greatest school of
thought then flourishing, the University of Paris. It is by the study of such
books that one enters into the mental life of the period at which they were written;
not by the hasty perusal of Histories of Philosophy. No student of the Contra
Gentiles is likely to acquiesce in the statement, that the Middle Ages were a
time when mankind seemed to have lost the power of thinking for themselves.
Mediaeval people thought for themselves, thoughts curiously different from
ours, and profitable for us to study.
================
Catechism of the Catholic Church
II. WAYS OF COMING TO KNOW GOD
31 Created in God's image and called to know and love him, the
person who seeks God discovers certain ways of coming to know him. These are
also called proofs for the existence of God, not in the sense of proofs in the
natural sciences, but rather in the sense of "converging and convincing
arguments", which allow us to attain certainty about the truth. These
"ways" of approaching God from creation have a twofold point of
departure: the physical world, and the human person.
32 The world: starting from movement, becoming, contingency, and
the world's order and beauty, one can come to a knowledge of God as the origin
and the end of the universe.
As St. Paul says of the Gentiles: For what can be known about God
is plain to them, because God has shown it to them. Ever since the creation of
the world his invisible nature, namely, his eternal power and deity, has been
clearly perceived in the things that have been made.7
And St. Augustine issues this challenge: Question the beauty of
the earth, question the beauty of the sea, question the beauty of the air
distending and diffusing itself, question the beauty of the sky... question all
these realities. All respond: "See, we are beautiful." Their beauty
is a profession [confessio]. These beauties are subject to change. Who made
them if not the Beautiful One [Pulcher] who is not subject to change?8
33 The human person: with his openness to truth and beauty, his
sense of moral goodness, his freedom and the voice of his conscience, with his
longings for the infinite and for happiness, man questions himself about God's
existence. In all this he discerns signs of his spiritual soul. The soul, the
"seed of eternity we bear in ourselves, irreducible to the merely
material",9 can have its origin only in God.
34 The world, and man, attest that they contain within themselves
neither their first principle nor their final end, but rather that they
participate in Being itself, which alone is without origin or end. Thus, in
different ways, man can come to know that there exists a reality which is the
first cause and final end of all things, a reality "that everyone calls
God".10
35 Man's faculties make him capable of coming to a knowledge of
the existence of a personal God. But for man to be able to enter into real
intimacy with him, God willed both to reveal himself to man and to give him the
grace of being able to welcome this revelation in faith. The proofs of God's
existence, however, can predispose one to faith and help one to see that faith
is not opposed to reason.
III. THE KNOWLEDGE OF GOD ACCORDING TO THE CHURCH
36 "Our holy mother, the Church, holds and teaches that God,
the first principle and last end of all things, can be known with certainty
from the created world by the natural light of human reason."11 Without
this capacity, man would not be able to welcome God's revelation. Man has this
capacity because he is created "in the image of God".12
37 In the historical conditions in which he finds himself,
however, man experiences many difficulties in coming to know God by the light
of reason alone:
Though human reason is, strictly speaking, truly capable by its
own natural power and light of attaining to a true and certain knowledge of the
one personal God, who watches over and controls the world by his providence,
and of the natural law written in our hearts by the Creator; yet there are many
obstacles which prevent reason from the effective and fruitful use of this
inborn faculty. For the truths that concern the relations between God and man
wholly transcend the visible order of things, and, if they are translated into
human action and influence it, they call for self-surrender and abnegation. The
human mind, in its turn, is hampered in the attaining of such truths, not only
by the impact of the senses and the imagination, but also by disordered
appetites which are the consequences of original sin. So it happens that men in
such matters easily persuade themselves that what they would not like to be
true is false or at least doubtful.13
38 This is why man stands in need of being enlightened by God's revelation, not only about those things that exceed his understanding, but also "about those religious and moral truths which of themselves are not beyond the grasp of human reason, so that even in the present condition of the human race, they can be known by all men with ease, with firm certainty and with no admixture of error". 14
IV. HOW CAN WE SPEAK ABOUT GOD?
39 In defending the ability of human reason to know God, the
Church is expressing her confidence in the possibility of speaking about him to
all men and with all men, and therefore of dialogue with other religions, with
philosophy and science, as well as with unbelievers and atheists.
40 Since our knowledge of God is limited, our language about him
is equally so. We can name God only by taking creatures as our starting point,
and in accordance with our limited human ways of knowing and thinking.
41 All creatures bear a certain resemblance to God, most
especially man, created in the image and likeness of God. The manifold
perfections of creatures - their truth, their goodness, their beauty all
reflect the infinite perfection of God. Consequently we can name God by taking
his creatures" perfections as our starting point, "for from the
greatness and beauty of created things comes a corresponding perception of
their Creator".15
42 God transcends all creatures. We must therefore continually
purify our language of everything in it that is limited, image-bound or
imperfect, if we are not to confuse our image of God--"the inexpressible,
the incomprehensible, the invisible, the ungraspable"--with our human
representations.16 Our human words always fall short of the mystery of God.
43 Admittedly, in speaking about God like this, our language is
using human modes of expression; nevertheless it really does attain to God
himself, though unable to express him in his infinite simplicity. Likewise, we
must recall that "between Creator and creature no similitude can be
expressed without implying an even greater dissimilitude";17 and that
"concerning God, we cannot grasp what he is, but only what he is not, and
how other beings stand in relation to him."18
III. THE CHARACTERISTICS OF FAITH
Faith is a grace
153 When St. Peter confessed that Jesus is the Christ, the Son of
the living God, Jesus declared to him that this revelation did not come
"from flesh and blood", but from "my Father who is in
heaven".24 Faith is a gift of God, a supernatural virtue infused by him.
"Before this faith can be exercised, man must have the grace of God to
move and assist him; he must have the interior helps of the Holy Spirit, who
moves the heart and converts it to God, who opens the eyes of the mind and
'makes it easy for all to accept and believe the truth.'"25
Faith is a human act
154 Believing is possible only by grace and the interior helps of
the Holy Spirit. But it is no less true that believing is an authentically
human act. Trusting in God and cleaving to the truths he has revealed is
contrary neither to human freedom nor to human reason. Even in human relations
it is not contrary to our dignity to believe what other persons tell us about
themselves and their intentions, or to trust their promises (for example, when
a man and a woman marry) to share a communion of life with one another. If this
is so, still less is it contrary to our dignity to "yield by faith the
full submission of... intellect and will to God who reveals",26 and to
share in an interior communion with him.
155 In faith, the human intellect and will cooperate with divine
grace: "Believing is an act of the intellect assenting to the divine truth
by command of the will moved by God through grace."27
Faith and understanding
156 What moves us to believe is not the fact that revealed truths
appear as true and intelligible in the light of our natural reason: we believe
"because of the authority of God himself who reveals them, who can neither
deceive nor be deceived".28 So "that the submission of our faith
might nevertheless be in accordance with reason, God willed that external
proofs of his Revelation should be joined to the internal helps of the Holy
Spirit."29 Thus the miracles of Christ and the saints, prophecies, the
Church's growth and holiness, and her fruitfulness and stability "are the
most certain signs of divine Revelation, adapted to the intelligence of all";
they are "motives of credibility" (motiva credibilitatis), which show
that the assent of faith is "by no means a blind impulse of the
mind".30
157 Faith is certain. It is more certain than all human knowledge
because it is founded on the very word of God who cannot lie. To be sure,
revealed truths can seem obscure to human reason and experience, but "the
certainty that the divine light gives is greater than that which the light of
natural reason gives."31 "Ten thousand difficulties do not make one
doubt."32
158 "Faith seeks understanding":33 it is intrinsic to
faith that a believer desires to know better the One in whom he has put his
faith, and to understand better what He has revealed; a more penetrating
knowledge will in turn call forth a greater faith, increasingly set afire by
love. The grace of faith opens "the eyes of your hearts"34 to a
lively understanding of the contents of Revelation: that is, of the totality of
God's plan and the mysteries of faith, of their connection with each other and
with Christ, the center of the revealed mystery. "The same Holy Spirit
constantly perfects faith by his gifts, so that Revelation may be more and more
profoundly understood."35 In the words of St. Augustine, "I believe,
in order to understand; and I understand, the better to believe."36
159 Faith and science: "Though faith is above reason, there
can never be any real discrepancy between faith and reason. Since the same God
who reveals mysteries and infuses faith has bestowed the light of reason on the
human mind, God cannot deny himself, nor can truth ever contradict
truth."37 "Consequently, methodical research in all branches of
knowledge, provided it is carried out in a truly scientific manner and does not
override moral laws, can never conflict with the faith, because the things of
the world and the things of faith derive from the same God. The humble and
persevering investigator of the secrets of nature is being led, as it were, by
the hand of God in spite of himself, for it is God, the conserver of all
things, who made them what they are."38
The freedom of faith
160 To be human, "man's response to God by faith must be
free, and... therefore nobody is to be forced to embrace the faith against his
will. The act of faith is of its very nature a free act."39 "God calls
men to serve him in spirit and in truth. Consequently they are bound to him in
conscience, but not coerced... This fact received its fullest manifestation in
Christ Jesus."40 Indeed, Christ invited people to faith and conversion,
but never coerced them. "For he bore witness to the truth but refused to
use force to impose it on those who spoke against it. His kingdom... grows by
the love with which Christ, lifted up on the cross, draws men to
himself."41
The necessity of faith
161 Believing in Jesus Christ and in the One who sent him for our
salvation is necessary for obtaining that salvation.42 "Since
"without faith it is impossible to please [God]" and to attain to the
fellowship of his sons, therefore without faith no one has ever attained
justification, nor will anyone obtain eternal life 'But he who endures to the
end.'"43
Perseverance in faith
162 Faith is an entirely free gift that God makes to man. We can
lose this priceless gift, as St. Paul indicated to St. Timothy: "Wage the
good warfare, holding faith and a good conscience. By rejecting conscience,
certain persons have made shipwreck of their faith."44 To live, grow and
persevere in the faith until the end we must nourish it with the word of God;
we must beg the Lord to increase our faith;45 it must be "working through
charity," abounding in hope, and rooted in the faith of the Church.46
ARTICLE 1 MAN: THE IMAGE OF GOD
1701 "Christ, in the very revelation of the mystery of the
Father and of his love, makes man fully manifest to himself and brings to light
his exalted vocation."2 It is in Christ, "the image of the invisible
God,"3 that man has been created "in the image and likeness" of
the Creator. It is in Christ, Redeemer and Savior, that the divine image,
disfigured in man by the first sin, has been restored to its original beauty
and ennobled by the grace of God.4
1702 The divine image is present in every man. It shines forth in
the communion of persons, in the likeness of the unity of the divine persons
among themselves (cf. chapter two).
1703 Endowed with "a spiritual and immortal" soul,5 the
human person is "the only creature on earth that God has willed for its
own sake."6 From his conception, he is destined for eternal beatitude.
1704 The human person participates in the light and power of the
divine Spirit. By his reason, he is capable of understanding the order of
things established by the Creator. By free will, he is capable of directing
himself toward his true good. He finds his perfection "in seeking and
loving what is true and good."7
1705 By virtue of his soul and his spiritual powers of intellect
and will, man is endowed with freedom, an "outstanding manifestation of
the divine image."8
1706 By his reason, man recognizes the voice of God which urges
him "to do what is good and avoid what is evil."9 Everyone is obliged
to follow this law, which makes itself heard in conscience and is fulfilled in
the love of God and of neighbor. Living a moral life bears witness to the
dignity of the person.
1707 "Man, enticed by the Evil One, abused his freedom at the
very beginning of history."10 He succumbed to temptation and did what was
evil. He still desires the good, but his nature bears the wound of original
sin. He is now inclined to evil and subject to error:
Man is divided in himself. As a result, the whole life of men,
both individual and social, shows itself to be a struggle, and a dramatic one,
between good and evil, between light and darkness.11
1708 By his Passion, Christ delivered us from Satan and from sin. He
merited for us the new life in the Holy Spirit. His grace restores what sin had
damaged in us.
1709 He who believes in Christ becomes a son of God. This filial
adoption transforms him by giving him the ability to follow the example of
Christ. It makes him capable of acting rightly and doing good. In union with
his Savior, the disciple attains the perfection of charity which is holiness.
Having matured in grace, the moral life blossoms into eternal life in the glory
of heaven.