TALK FIVE - FATE & FREE WILL (60m)
---- Audio - Carl Orff: Carmina Burana - O Fortuna (3m)
---- City of God - Bk 5: Ch 9-10
---- ST: P1, Q116 A1;
P1, Q116 A2; P1, Q116
A3; P1, Q116, A4; P1, Q83, A1; P1, Q83 A2
---- Catechism -1730-1742
BOOK V CHAPTER 9
CONCERNING THE FOREKNOWLEDGE OF GOD AND THE FREE WILL OF MAN, IN
OPPOSITION TO THE DEFINITION OF CICERO
The manner in which Cicero addresses himself to the task of
refuting the Stoics, shows that he did not think he could effect anything
against them in argument unless he had first demolished divination. And this he
attempts to accomplish by denying that there is any knowledge of future things,
and maintains with all his might that there is no such knowledge either in God
or man, and that there is no prediction of events. Thus he both denies the
foreknowledge of God, and attempts by vain arguments, and by opposing to
himself certain oracles very easy to be refuted, to overthrow all prophecy,
even such as is clearer than the light (though even these oracles are not
refuted by him).
But, in refuting these conjectures of the mathematicians, his
argument is triumphant, because truly these are such as destroy and refute
themselves. Nevertheless, they are far more tolerable who assert the fatal
influence of the stars than they who deny the foreknowledge of future events.
For, to confess that God exists, and at the same time to deny that He has
foreknowledge of future things, is the most manifest folly. This Cicero himself
saw, and therefore attempted to assert the doctrine embodied in the words of
Scripture, "The feel hath said in his heart, There is no God." That,
however, he did not do in his own person, for he saw how odious and offensive
such an opinion would be; and therefore, in his book on the nature of the gods,
he makes Cotta dispute concerning this against the Stoics, and preferred to
give his own opinion in favor of Lucilius Balbus, to whom he assigned the
defense of the Stoical position, rather than in favor of Cotta, who maintained
that no divinity exists. However, in his book on divination, he in his own
person most openly opposes the doctrine of the prescience of future things. But
all this he seems to do in order that he may not grant the doctrine of fate,
and by so doing destroy free will. For he thinks that, the knowledge of future
things being once conceded, fate follows as so necessary a consequence that it
cannot be denied. But, let these perplexing debatings and disputations of the
philosophers go on as they may, we, in order that we may confess the most high
and true God Himself, do confess His will, supreme power, and prescience.
Neither let us be afraid lest, after all, we do not do by will that which we do
by will, because He, whose foreknowledge is infallible, foreknew that we would
do it. It was this which Cicero was afraid of, and therefore opposed
foreknowledge. The Stoics also maintained that all things do not come to pass
by necessity, although they contended that all things happen according to
destiny. What is it, then, that Cicero feared in the prescience of future
things? Doubtless it was this, ‹ that if all future things have been
foreknown, they will happen in the order in which they have been foreknown; and
if they come to pass in this order, there is a certain order of things foreknown
by God; and if a certain order of things, then a certain order of causes, for
nothing can happen which is not preceded by some efficient cause. But if there
is a certain order of causes according to which everything happens which does
happen, then by fate, says he, all things happen which do happen. But if this
be so, then is there nothing in our own power, and there is no such thing as
freedom of will; and if we grant that, says he, the whole economy of human life
is subverted. In vain are laws enacted. In vain are reproaches, praises,
chidings, exhortations had recourse to; and there is no justice whatever in the
appointment of rewards for the good, and punishments for the wicked. And that
consequences so disgraceful, and absurd, and pernicious to humanity may not
follow, Cicero chooses to reject the foreknowledge of future things, and shuts
up the religious mind to this alternative, to make choice between two things,
either that something is in our own power, or that there is foreknowledge, ‹ both of which
cannot be true; but if the one is affirmed, the other is thereby denied. He
therefore, like a truly great and wise man, and one who consulted very much and
very skillfully for the good of humanity, of those two chose the freedom of the
will, to confirm which he denied the foreknowledge of future things; and thus,
wishing to make men free he makes them sacrilegious. But the religious mind
chooses both, confesses both, and maintains both by the faith of piety. But how
so? says Cicero; for the knowledge of future things being granted, there
follows a chain of consequences which ends in this, that there can be nothing
depending on our own free wills. And further, if there is anything depending on
our wills, we must go backwards by the same steps of reasoning till we arrive
at the conclusion that there is no foreknowledge of future things. For we go
backwards through all the steps in the following order:‹ If there is free
will, all things do not happen according to fate; if all things do not. happen
according to fate, there is not a certain order of causes; and if there is not
a certain order of causes, neither is there a certain order of things foreknown
by God, ‹ for things cannot come to pass except they are preceded by
efficient causes, ‹ but, if there is no fixed and certain order of causes fore-known
by God, all things cannot be said to happen according as He foreknew that they
would happen. And further, if it is not true that all things happen just as
they have been foreknown by Him, there is not, says he, in God any
foreknowledge of future events.
Now, against the sacrilegious and impious darings of reason, we
assert both that God knows all things before they come to pass, and that we do
by our free will whatsoever we know and feel to be done by us only because we
will it. But that all things come to pass by fate, we do not say; nay we affirm
that nothing comes to pass by fate; for we demonstrate that the name of fate,
as it is wont to be used by those who speak of fate, meaning thereby the
position of the stars at the time of each one's conception or birth, is an
unmeaning word, for astrology itself is a delusion. But an order of causes in
which the highest efficiency is attributed to the will of God, we neither deny
nor do we designate it by the name of fate, unless, perhaps, we may understand
fate to mean that which is spoken, deriving it from fari, to speak; for we
cannot deny that it is written in the sacred Scriptures, "God hath spoken
once; these two things have I heard, that power belongeth unto God. Also unto
Thee, O God, belongeth mercy: for Thou wilt render unto every man according to
his works." Now the expression, "Once hath He spoken," is to be
understood as meaning "immovably," that is, unchangeably hath He
spoken, inasmuch as He knows unchangeably all things which shall be, and all
things which He will do. We might, then, use the word fate in the sense it
bears when derived from fari, to speak, had it not already come to be
understood in another sense, into which I am unwilling that the hearts of men
should unconsciously slide. But it does not follow that, though there is for
God a certain order of all causes, there must therefore be nothing depending on
the free exercise of our own wills, for our wills themselves are included in
that order of causes which is certain to God, and is embraced by His
foreknowledge, for human wills are also causes of human actions; and He who
foreknew all the causes of things would certainly among those causes not have
been ignorant of our wills. For even that very concession which Cicero himself
makes is enough to refute him in this argument. For what does it help him to
say that nothing takes place without a cause, but that every cause is not
fatal, there being a fortuitous cause, a natural cause, and a voluntary cause?
It is sufficient that he confesses that whatever happens must be preceded by a
cause. For we say that those causes which are called fortuitous are not a mere
name for the absence of causes, but are only latent, and we attribute them
either to the will of the true God, or to that of spirits of some kind or
other. And as to natural causes, we by no means separate them from the will of
Him who is the author and framer of all nature. But now as to voluntary causes.
They are referable either to God, or to angels, or to men, or to animals of
whatever description, if indeed those instinctive movements of animals devoid
of reason, by which, in accordance with their own nature, they seek or shun
various things, are to be called wills. And when I speak of the wills of
angels, I mean either the wills of good angels, whom we call the angels of God,
or of the wicked angels, whom we call the angels of the devil, or demons. Also
by the wills of men I mean the wills either of the good or of the wicked. And
from this we conclude that there are no efficient causes of all things which
come to pass unless voluntary causes, that is, such as belong to that nature
which is the spirit of life. For the air or wind is called spirit, but,
inasmuch as it is a body, it is not the spirit of life. The spirit of life,
therefore, which quickens all things, and is the creator of every body, and of
every created spirit, is God Himself, the uncreated spirit. In His supreme will
resides the power which acts on the wills of all created spirits, helping the
good, judging the evil, controlling all, granting power to some, not granting
it to others. For, as He is the creator of all natures, so also is He the
bestower of all powers, not of all wills; for wicked wills are not from Him,
being contrary to nature, which is from Him. As to bodies, they are more
subject to wills: some to our wills, by which I mean the wills of all living
mortal creatures, but more to the wills of men than of beasts. But all of them
are most of all subject to the will of God, to whom all wills also are subject,
since they have no power except what He has bestowed upon them. The cause of
things, therefore, which makes but is made, is God; but all other causes both
make and are made. Such are all created spirits, and especially the rational.
Material causes, therefore, which may rather be said to be made than to make,
are not to be reckoned among efficient causes, because they can only do what
the wills of spirits do by them. How, then, does an order of causes which is certain
to the foreknowledge of God necessitate that there should be nothing which is
dependent on our wills, when our wills themselves have a very important place
in the order of causes? Cicero, then, contends with those who call this order
of causes fatal, or rather designate this order itself by the name of fate; to
which we have an abhorrence, especially on account of the word, which men have
become accustomed to understand as meaning what is not true. But, whereas he
denies that the order of all causes is most certain, and perfectly clear to the
prescience of God, we detest his opinion more than the Stoics do. For he either
denies that God exists, ‹ which, indeed, in an assumed personage, he has labored to do, in
his book De Natura Deorum, ‹ or if he confesses that He exists, but
denies that He is prescient of future things, what is that but just "the
fool saying in his heart there is no God?" For one who is not prescient of
all future things is not God. Wherefore our wills also have just so much power
as God willed and foreknew that they should have; and therefore whatever power
they have, they have it within most certain limits; and whatever they are to
do, they are most assuredly to do, for He whose foreknowledge is infallible
foreknew that they would have the power to do it, and would do it. Wherefore,
if I should choose to apply the name of fate to anything at all, I should
rather say that fate belongs to the weaker of two parties, will to the
stronger, who has the other in his power, than that the freedom of our will is
excluded by that order of causes, which, by an unusual application of the word
peculiar to themselves, the Stoics call Fate. BOOK V CHAPTER10 WHETHER OUR WILLS ARE RULED BY NECESSITY Wherefore,
neither is that necessity to be feared, for dread of which the Stoics labored
to make such distinctions among the causes of things as should enable them to
rescue certain things from the dominion of necessity. and to subject others to
it. Among those things which they wished not to be subject to necessity they
placed our wills, knowing that they would not be free if subjected to
necessity. For if that is to be called our necessity which is not in our power,
but even though we be unwilling effects what it can effect, ‹ as, for instance,
the necessity of death, ‹ it is manifest that our wills by which we live up-rightly or
wickedly are not under such a necessity; for we do many things which, if we
were not willing, we should certainly not do. This is primarily true of the act
of willing itself, ‹ for if we will, it is; if we will not, it is not, ‹ for we should not
will if we were unwilling. But if we define necessity to be that according to
which we say that it is necessary that anything be of such or such a nature, or
be done in such and such a manner, I know not why we should have any dread of
that necessity taking away the freedom of our will. For we do not put the life
of God or the foreknowledge of God under necessity if we should say that it is
necessary that God should live forever, and foreknow all things; as neither is
His power diminished when we say that He cannot die or fall into error, ‹ for this is in such
a way impossible to Him, that if it were possible for Him, He would be of less
power. But assuredly He is rightly called omnipotent, though He can neither die
nor fall into error. For He is called omnipotent on account of His doing what
He wills, not on account of His suffering what He wills not; for if that should
befall Him, He would by no means be omnipotent. Wherefore, He cannot do some
things for the very reason that He is omnipotent. So also, when we say that it
is necessary that, when we will, we will by free choice, in so saying we both
affirm what is true beyond doubt, and do not still subject our wills thereby to
a necessity which destroys liberty. Our wills, therefore, exist as wills, and
do themselves whatever we do by willing, and which would not be done if we were
unwilling. But when any one suffers anything, being unwilling by the will of
another, even in that case will retains its essential validity,‹ we do not mean the
will of the party who inflicts the suffering, for we resolve it into the power
of God. For if a will should simply exist, but not be able to do what it wills,
it would be overborne by a more powerful will. Nor would this be the case
unless there had existed will, and that not the will of the other party, but
the will of him who willed, but was not able to accomplish what he willed,
therefore, whatsoever a man suffers contrary to his own will, he ought not to attribute
to the will of men, or of angels, or of any created spirit, but rather to His
will who gives power to wills. It is not the case, therefore, that because God
foreknew what would be in the power of our wills, there is for that reason
nothing in the power of our wills. For he who foreknew this did not foreknow
nothing. Moreover, if He who foreknew what would be in the power of our wills
did not foreknow nothing, but something, assuredly, even though He did
foreknow, there is something in the power of our wills. Therefore we are by no
means compelled, either, retaining the prescience of God, to take away the
freedom of the will, or, retaining the freedom of the will, to deny that He is
prescient of future things, which is impious. But we embrace both. We
faithfully and sincerely confess both. The former, that we may believe well;
the latter, that we may live well. For he lives ill who does not believe well
concerning God. Wherefore, be it far from us, in order to maintain our freedom,
to deny the prescience of Him by whose help we are or shall be free.
Consequently, it is not in vain that laws are enacted, and that reproaches,
exhortations, praises, and vituperations are had recourse to; for these also He
foreknew, and they are of great avail, even as great as He foreknew that they
would be of. Prayers, also, are of avail to procure those things which He
foreknew that He would grant to those who offered them; and with justice have
rewards been appointed for good deeds, and punishments for sins. For a man does
not therefore sin because God foreknew that he would sin. Nay, it cannot be
doubted but that it is the man himself who sins when he does sin, because He,
whose foreknowledge is infallible, fore knew not that fate, or fortune, or
something else would sin, but that the man himself would sin, who, if he wills
not, sins not. But if he shall not will to sin, even this did God foreknow.
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P1, Q116 A1 - Whether there be such a thing as fate?
Objection 1: It would seem that fate is nothing. For Gregory says
in a homily for the Epiphany (Hom. x in Evang.): "Far be it from the
hearts of the faithful to think that fate is anything real."
Objection 2: Further, what happens by fate is not unforeseen, for
as Augustine says (De Civ. Dei v, 4), "fate is understood to be derived
from the verb 'fari' which means to speak"; as though things were said to
happen by fate, which are "fore-spoken" by one who decrees them to
happen. Now what is foreseen is neither lucky nor chance-like. If therefore
things happen by fate, there will be neither luck nor chance in the world.
On the contrary, What does not exist cannot be defined. But
Boethius (De Consol. iv) defines fate thus: "Fate is a disposition
inherent to changeable things, by which Providence connects each one with its
proper order."
I answer that, In this world some things seem to happen by luck or
chance. Now it happens sometimes that something is lucky or chance-like as
compared to inferior causes, which, if compared to some higher cause, is
directly intended. For instance, if two servants are sent by their master to
the same place; the meeting of the two servants in regard to themselves is by
chance; but as compared to the master, who had ordered it, it is directly
intended. So there were some who refused to refer to a higher cause such events
which by luck or chance take place here below. These denied the existence of
fate and Providence, as Augustine relates of Tully (De Civ. Dei v, 9). And this
is contrary to what we have said above about Providence (Question [22], Article
[2]). On the other hand, some have considered that everything that takes place
here below by luck or by chance, whether in natural things or in human affairs,
is to be reduced to a superior cause, namely, the heavenly bodies. According to
these fate is nothing else than "a disposition of the stars under which
each one is begotten or born" [*Cf. St. Augustine De Civ. Dei v, 1,8,9].
But this will not hold. First, as to human affairs: because we have proved
above (Question [115], Article [4]) that human actions are not subject to the
action of heavenly bodies, save accidentally and indirectly. Now the cause of
fate, since it has the ordering of things that happen by fate, must of
necessity be directly and of itself the cause of what takes place. Secondly, as
to all things that happen accidentally: for it has been said (Question [115],
Article [6]) that what is accidental, is properly speaking neither a being, nor
a unity. But every action of nature terminates in some one thing. Wherefore it
is impossible for that which is accidental to be the proper effect of an active
natural principle. No natural cause can therefore have for its proper effect
that a man intending to dig a grace finds a treasure. Now it is manifest that a
heavenly body acts after the manner of a natural principle: wherefore its
effects in this world are natural. It is therefore impossible that any active
power of a heavenly body be the cause of what happens by accident here below,
whether by luck or by chance. We must therefore say that what happens here by
accident, both in natural things and in human affairs, is reduced to a
preordaining cause, which is Divine Providence. For nothing hinders that which
happens by accident being considered as one by an intellect: otherwise the
intellect could not form this proposition: "The digger of a grave found a
treasure." And just as an intellect can apprehend this so can it effect
it; for instance, someone who knows a place where a treasure is hidden, might
instigate a rustic, ignorant of this, to dig a grave there. Consequently,
nothing hinders what happens here by accident, by luck or by chance, being
reduced to some ordering cause which acts by the intellect, especially the
Divine intellect. For God alone can change the will, as shown above (Question
[105], Article [4]). Consequently the ordering of human actions, the principle
of which is the will, must be ascribed to God alone. So therefore inasmuch as
all that happens here below is subject to Divine Providence, as being
pre-ordained, and as it were "fore-spoken," we can admit the
existence of fate: although the holy doctors avoided the use of this word, on
account of those who twisted its application to a certain force in the position
of the stars. Hence Augustine says (De Civ. Dei v, 1): "If anyone ascribes
human affairs to fate, meaning thereby the will or power of God, let him keep
to his opinion, but hold his tongue." For this reason Gregory denies the
existence of fate: wherefore the first objection's solution is manifest.
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P1, Q116 A2 - Whether fate is in created things?
Objection 1: It would seem that fate is not in created things. For
Augustine says (De Civ. Dei v, 1) that the "Divine will or power is called
fate." But the Divine will or power is not in creatures, but in God.
Therefore fate is not in creatures but in God.
Objection 2: Further, fate is compared to things that happen by
fate, as their cause; as the very use of the word proves. But the universal
cause that of itself effects what takes place by accident here below, is God
alone, as stated above (Article [1]). Therefore fate is in God, and not in
creatures.
Objection 3: Further, if fate is in creatures, it is either a substance
or an accident: and whichever it is it must be multiplied according to the
number of creatures. Since, therefore, fate seems to be one thing only, it
seems that fate is not in creatures, but in God.
On the contrary, Boethius says (De Consol. iv): "Fate is a
disposition inherent to changeable things."
I answer that, As is clear from what has been stated above
(Question [22], Article [3]; Question [103], Article [6]), Divine Providence
produces effects through mediate causes. We can therefore consider the ordering
of the effects in two ways. Firstly, as being in God Himself: and thus the
ordering of the effects is called Providence. But if we consider this ordering
as being in the mediate causes ordered by God to the production of certain
effects, thus it has the nature of fate. This is what Boethius says (De Consol.
iv): "Fate is worked out when Divine Providence is served by certain
spirits; whether by the soul, or by all nature itself which obeys Him, whether
by the heavenly movements of the stars, whether by the angelic power, or by the
ingenuity of the demons, whether by some of these, or by all, the chain of fate
is forged." Of each of these things we have spoken above (Article [1];
Question [104], Article [2]; Question [110], Article [1]; Question [113];
Question [114]). It is therefore manifest that fate is in the created causes
themselves, as ordered by God to the production of their effects.
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P1, Q116 A3 - Whether fate is unchangeable?
Objection 1: It seems that fate is not unchangeable. For Boethius
says (De Consol. iv): "As reasoning is to the intellect, as the begotten
is to that which is, as time to eternity, as the circle to its centre; so is
the fickle chain of fate to the unwavering simplicity of Providence."
Objection 2: Further, the Philosopher says (Topic. ii, 7):
"If we be moved, what is in us is moved." But fate is a
"disposition inherent to changeable things," as Boethius says (De
Consol. iv). Therefore fate is changeable.
Objection 3: Further, if fate is unchangeable, what is subject to
fate happens unchangeably and of necessity. But things ascribed to fate seem
principally to be contingencies. Therefore there would be no contingencies in
the world, but all things would happen of necessity.
On the contrary, Boethius says (De Consol. iv) that fate is an
unchangeable disposition.
I answer that, The disposition of second causes which we call
fate, can be considered in two ways: firstly, in regard to the second causes,
which are thus disposed or ordered; secondly, in regard to the first principle,
namely, God, by Whom they are ordered. Some, therefore, have held that the
series itself or dispositions of causes is in itself necessary, so that all
things would happen of necessity; for this reason that each effect has a cause,
and given a cause the effect must follow of necessity. But this is false, as
proved above (Question [115], Article [6]). Others, on the other hand, held
that fate is changeable, even as dependent on Divine Providence. Wherefore the
Egyptians said that fate could be changed by certain sacrifices, as Gregory of
Nyssa says (Nemesius, De Homine). This too has been disproved above for the
reason that it is repugnant to Divine Providence. We must therefore say that
fate, considered in regard to second causes, is changeable; but as subject to
Divine Providence, it derives a certain unchangeableness, not of absolute but
of conditional necessity. In this sense we say that this conditional is true
and necessary: "If God foreknew that this would happen, it will
happen." Wherefore Boethius, having said that the chain of fate is fickle,
shortly afterwards adds---"which, since it is derived from an unchangeable
Providence must also itself be unchangeable."
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P1, Q116, A4 - Whether all things are subject to fate?
Objection 1: It seems that all things are subject to fate. For
Boethius says (De Consol. iv): "The chain of fate moves the heaven and the
stars, tempers the elements to one another, and models them by a reciprocal
transformation. By fate all things that are born into the world and perish are
renewed in a uniform progression of offspring and seed." Nothing therefore
seems to be excluded from the domain of fate.
Objection 2: Further, Augustine says (De Civ. Dei v, 1) that fate
is something real, as referred to the Divine will and power. But the Divine
will is cause of all things that happen, as Augustine says (De Trin. iii, 1
seqq.). Therefore all things are subject to fate.
Objection 3: Further, Boethius says (De Consol. iv) that fate
"is a disposition inherent to changeable things." But all creatures
are changeable, and God alone is truly unchangeable, as stated above (Question
[9], Article [2]). Therefore fate is in all things.
On the contrary, Boethius says (De Consol. iv) that "some
things subject to Providence are above the ordering of fate."
I answer that, As stated above (Article [2]), fate is the ordering
of second causes to effects foreseen by God. Whatever, therefore, is subject to
second causes, is subject also to fate. But whatever is done immediately by
God, since it is not subject to second causes, neither is it subject to fate;
such are creation, the glorification of spiritual substances, and the like. And
this is what Boethius says (De Consol. iv): viz. that "those things which
are nigh to God have a state of immobility, and exceed the changeable order of
fate." Hence it is clear that "the further a thing is from the First
Mind, the more it is involved in the chain of fate"; since so much the
more it is bound up with second causes.
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P1, Q83, A1 - Whether man has free-will?
Objection 1: It would seem that man has not free-will. For whoever
has free-will does what he wills. But man does not what he wills; for it is
written (Rm. 7:19): "For the good which I will I do not, but the evil
which I will not, that I do." Therefore man has not free-will.
Objection 2: Further, whoever has free-will has in his power to
will or not to will, to do or not to do. But this is not in man's power: for it
is written (Rm. 9:16): "It is not of him that willeth"---namely, to
will---"nor of him that runneth"---namely, to run. Therefore man has
not free-will.
Objection 3: Further, what is "free is cause of itself,"
as the Philosopher says (Metaph. i, 2). Therefore what is moved by another is
not free. But God moves the will, for it is written (Prov. 21:1): "The
heart of the king is in the hand of the Lord; whithersoever He will He shall
turn it" and (Phil. 2:13): "It is God Who worketh in you both to will
and to accomplish." Therefore man has not free-will.
Objection 4: Further, whoever has free-will is master of his own
actions. But man is not master of his own actions: for it is written (Jer.
10:23): "The way of a man is not his: neither is it in a man to
walk." Therefore man has not free-will.
Objection 5: Further, the Philosopher says (Ethic. iii, 5):
"According as each one is, such does the end seem to him." But it is
not in our power to be of one quality or another; for this comes to us from
nature. Therefore it is natural to us to follow some particular end, and
therefore we are not free in so doing.
On the contrary, It is written (Ecclus. 15:14): "God made man
from the beginning, and left him in the hand of his own counsel"; and the
gloss adds: "That is of his free-will."
I answer that, Man has free-will: otherwise counsels,
exhortations, commands, prohibitions, rewards, and punishments would be in
vain. In order to make this evident, we must observe that some things act
without judgment; as a stone moves downwards; and in like manner all things
which lack knowledge. And some act from judgment, but not a free judgment; as
brute animals. For the sheep, seeing the wolf, judges it a thing to be shunned,
from a natural and not a free judgment, because it judges, not from reason, but
from natural instinct. And the same thing is to be said of any judgment of
brute animals. But man acts from judgment, because by his apprehensive power he
judges that something should be avoided or sought. But because this judgment,
in the case of some particular act, is not from a natural instinct, but from
some act of comparison in the reason, therefore he acts from free judgment and retains
the power of being inclined to various things. For reason in contingent matters
may follow opposite courses, as we see in dialectic syllogisms and rhetorical
arguments. Now particular operations are contingent, and therefore in such
matters the judgment of reason may follow opposite courses, and is not
determinate to one. And forasmuch as man is rational is it necessary that man
have a free-will.
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P1, Q83 A2 - Whether free-will is a power?
Objection 1: It would seem that free-will is not a power. For
free-will is nothing but a free judgment. But judgment denominates an act, not
a power. Therefore free-will is not a power.
Objection 2: Further, free-will is defined as "the faculty of
the will and reason." But faculty denominates a facility of power, which
is due to a habit. Therefore free-will is a habit. Moreover Bernard says (De
Gratia et Lib. Arb. 1,2) that free-will is "the soul's habit of disposing
of itself." Therefore it is not a power.
Objection 3: Further, no natural power is forfeited through sin.
But free-will is forfeited through sin; for Augustine says that "man, by
abusing free-will, loses both it and himself." Therefore free-will is not
a power.
On the contrary, Nothing but a power, seemingly, is the subject of
a habit. But free-will is the subject of grace, by the help of which it chooses
what is good. Therefore free-will is a power.
I answer that, Although free-will [*Liberum arbitrium---i.e. free
judgment] in its strict sense denotes an act, in the common manner of speaking
we call free-will, that which is the principle of the act by which man judges
freely. Now in us the principle of an act is both power and habit; for we say
that we know something both by knowledge and by the intellectual power.
Therefore free-will must be either a power or a habit, or a power with a habit.
That it is neither a habit nor a power together with a habit, can be clearly
proved in two ways. First of all, because, if it is a habit, it must be a
natural habit; for it is natural to man to have a free-will. But there is not
natural habit in us with respect to those things which come under free-will:
for we are naturally inclined to those things of which we have natural
habits---for instance, to assent to first principles: while those things which
we are naturally inclined are not subject to free-will, as we have said of the
desire of happiness (Question [82], Articles [1],2). Wherefore it is against
the very notion of free-will that it should be a natural habit. And that it
should be a non-natural habit is against its nature. Therefore in no sense is
it a habit.
Secondly, this is
clear because habits are defined as that "by reason of which we are well
or ill disposed with regard to actions and passions" (Ethic. ii, 5); for
by temperance we are well-disposed as regards concupiscences, and by
intemperance ill-disposed: and by knowledge we are well-disposed to the act of
the intellect when we know the truth, and by the contrary ill-disposed. But the
free-will is indifferent to good and evil choice: wherefore it is impossible
for free-will to be a habit. Therefore it is a power.
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CATECHISM OF THE CATHOLIC CHURCH
1730 God created man a rational being, conferring on him the dignity
of a person who can initiate and control his own actions. "God willed that
man should be 'left in the hand of his own counsel,' so that he might of his
own accord seek his Creator and freely attain his full and blessed perfection
by cleaving to him."26
Man is rational and therefore like God; he is created with free
will and is master over his acts.27
I. FREEDOM AND RESPONSIBILITY
1731 Freedom is the power, rooted in reason and will, to act or
not to act, to do this or that, and so to perform deliberate actions on one's
own responsibility. By free will one shapes one's own life. Human freedom is a
force for growth and maturity in truth and goodness; it attains its perfection
when directed toward God, our beatitude.
1732 As long as freedom has not bound itself definitively to its
ultimate good which is God, there is the possibility of choosing between good
and evil, and thus of growing in perfection or of failing and sinning. This
freedom characterizes properly human acts. It is the basis of praise or blame,
merit or reproach.
1733 The more one does what is good, the freer one becomes. There
is no true freedom except in the service of what is good and just. The choice
to disobey and do evil is an abuse of freedom and leads to "the slavery of
sin."28
1734 Freedom makes man responsible for his acts to the extent that
they are voluntary. Progress in virtue, knowledge of the good, and ascesis
enhance the mastery of the will over its acts.
1735 Imputability and responsibility for an action can be diminished
or even nullified by ignorance, inadvertence, duress, fear, habit, inordinate
attachments, and other psychological or social factors.
1736 Every act directly willed is imputable to its author:
Thus the Lord asked Eve after the sin in the garden: "What is
this that you have done?"29 He asked Cain the same question.30 The prophet
Nathan questioned David in the same way after he committed adultery with the
wife of Uriah and had him murdered.31
An action can be indirectly voluntary when it results from
negligence regarding something one should have known or done: for example, an
accident arising from ignorance of traffic laws.
1737 An effect can be tolerated without being willed by its agent;
for instance, a mother's exhaustion from tending her sick child. A bad effect
is not imputable if it was not willed either as an end or as a means of an
action, e.g., a death a person incurs in aiding someone in danger. For a bad
effect to be imputable it must be foreseeable and the agent must have the possibility
of avoiding it, as in the case of manslaughter caused by a drunken driver.
1738 Freedom is exercised in relationships between human beings.
Every human person, created in the image of God, has the natural right to be
recognized as a free and responsible being. All owe to each other this duty of
respect. The right to the exercise of freedom, especially in moral and
religious matters, is an inalienable requirement of the dignity of the human
person. This right must be recognized and protected by civil authority within
the limits of the common good and public order.32
II. HUMAN FREEDOM IN THE ECONOMY OF SALVATION
1739 Freedom and sin. Man's freedom is limited and fallible. In
fact, man failed. He freely sinned. By refusing God's plan of love, he deceived
himself and became a slave to sin. This first alienation engendered a multitude
of others. From its outset, human history attests the wretchedness and
oppression born of the human heart in consequence of the abuse of freedom.
1740 Threats to freedom. The exercise of freedom does not imply a
right to say or do everything. It is false to maintain that man, "the
subject of this freedom," is "an individual who is fully
self-sufficient and whose finality is the satisfaction of his own interests in
the enjoyment of earthly goods."33 Moreover, the economic, social,
political, and cultural conditions that are needed for a just exercise of
freedom are too often disregarded or violated. Such situations of blindness and
injustice injure the moral life and involve the strong as well as the weak in
the temptation to sin against charity. By deviating from the moral law man
violates his own freedom, becomes imprisoned within himself, disrupts
neighborly fellowship, and rebels against divine truth.
1741 Liberation and salvation. By his glorious Cross Christ has
won salvation for all men. He redeemed them from the sin that held them in
bondage. "For freedom Christ has set us free."34 In him we have
communion with the "truth that makes us free."35 The Holy Spirit has
been given to us and, as the Apostle teaches, "Where the Spirit of the
Lord is, there is freedom."36 Already we glory in the "liberty of the
children of God."37
1742 Freedom and grace. The grace of Christ is not in the
slightest way a rival of our freedom when this freedom accords with the sense
of the true and the good that God has put in the human heart. On the contrary,
as Christian experience attests especially in prayer, the more docile we are to
the promptings of grace, the more we grow in inner freedom and confidence
during trials, such as those we face in the pressures and constraints of the
outer world. By the working of grace the Holy Spirit educates us in spiritual
freedom in order to make us free collaborators in his work in the Church and in
the world: